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State Efforts to Create an Inclusive Marijuana 
Industry in the Shadow of the Unjust War on 
Drugs 
MATHEW SWINBURNE & KATHLEEN HOKE*© 
INTRODUCTION 
Even though marijuana1 is illegal under federal law, state legislative efforts have 
created a booming legal marijuana industry. California was the first state to legalize 
marijuana for medical purposes in 1996.2 Now 33 states and the District of Columbia 
have medical marijuana programs and 11 states and the District of Columbia have 
legalized recreational use of marijuana for adults.3  This legal marijuana industry 
was valued at $10.4 billion dollars in 2018 and is expected to grow to $30 billion by 
2025.4  The economic power of this industry is also reflected in the jobs it has 
created.  The legal marijuana industry directly employs around 211,000 Americans.5 
 
©Mathew Swinburne & Kathleen Hoke, 2020. 
* Mathew Swinburne J.D., is the Associate Director at the Network for Public Health Law-Eastern Region and 
an Adjunct Professor at the University of Maryland, College Park, School of Public Health. Kathleen Hoke, J.D., 
is a Law School Professor at the University of Maryland Carey School of Law and Director of the Network for 
Public Health Law-Eastern Region. 
 1. We have chosen to use the term marijuana for this article because of the general familiarity with this 
term. However, federal and state regulations utilize a variety of terms for this plant including marihuana and 
cannabis.  We will only use these terms if they are in a quote or are part of the title of a statute or regulation 
title. 
 2. Compassionate Use Act of 1996, 1996 Cal Legis. Serv. Prop. 215 (codified as amended at 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5). 
 3. See State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 16, 2019), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx (providing a national survey of state 
medical marijuana programs); see also Marijuana Overview, Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURE (Oct. 17, 2019), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/marijuana-overview.aspx (providing a national survey 
of state adult use/recreational marijuana programs). 
 4. See Gillian Flaccus, Legal Marijuana Industry Toasts Banner Year, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 27, 2018), 
https://apnews.com/0bd3cdbae26c4f99be359d6fe32f0d49 (indicating that the legal cannabis industry was 
valued at $10.4 billion in 2018); see also Iris Dorbian, New Cannabis Report Predicts Legal Sales to Reach Nearly 
$30 Billion by 2025, FORBES (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/irisdorbian/2019/09/24/new-
cannabis-report-predicts-legal-sales-to-reach-nearly-30-billion-by-2025/#18fb65aa1121 (reporting projections 
for legal cannabis sales for 2025). 
 5. Bruce Barcott & Beau Whitney, Special Report: Cannabis Jobs Count, LEAFLY (Mar. 2019), 
https://d3atagt0rnqk7k.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/01141121/CANNABIS-JOBS-REPORT-
FINAL-2.27.191.pdf. 
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However, when the ancillary jobs (marketing firms, accountants, lawyers, etc.) that 
support the legal cannabis industry are accounted for the estimate rises to 
296,000.6  
While the legalization of marijuana is creating financial opportunities, these 
opportunities are not equitably enjoyed.  A 2017 survey of the industry revealed 
that 81% of marijuana business owners are white while only 4.3% of marijuana 
business owners are African-American, 5.7% are Hispanic/Latino, 2.4% Asian, and 
6.7% identify as other.7  These disparities are magnified when juxtaposed to the 
damage done to communities of color as part of America’s War on Drugs.8  
Emblematic of the harm created by the inequitable enforcement of our nation’s 
drug laws, one report revealed that despite comparable rates of marijuana use, 
Black Americans were almost four times as likely to be arrested for marijuana 
possession as their white counterparts.9  State governments have recognized the 
disjointed relationship between the financial opportunity of legalized marijuana 
and the damages of the war on drugs. This recognition has resulted in the 
enactment of policies aimed at addressing this social justice issue. 
Part I of this article discusses the evolution of marijuana regulation. Part II 
explores the impacts of disparate enforcement of drug laws as a social justice issue. 
Part III examines state policies focused on creating equitable access to the financial 
opportunities created by the legal cannabis industry.  Part IV of the article examines 
state efforts to utilize tax revenue from the legal cannabis industry to reinvest in 
communities that were disproportionately impacted by previous drug policies, 
efforts that hold promise for restoring impacted communities through economic 
development and violence prevention. 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF CANNABIS LAWS AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT  
A. Federal Regulation of Marijuana  
Early in our nation’s history cannabis was a valued commodity used to create a 
broad spectrum of products including rope, sails for ships, material for clothing, and 
 
 6. Id. 
 7. Women & Minorities in the Marijuana Industry: 10 Charts, MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY at 10 (2017), 
https://mjbizdaily.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Women-and-Minorities-Report.pdf. 
 8. See Altaf Rahamatulla, The War on Drugs has Failed. What’s Next?, FORD FOUND. (Mar. 23, 2017),  
https://www.fordfoundation.org/ideas/equals-change-blog/posts/the-war-on-drugs-has-failed-what-s-next/ 
(discussing disparate impact of the war on drugs on black and Latino communities); Doing Time: Incarceration, 
the War on Drugs, and Public Health, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 782, 782 (May 2008), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2374804/ (discussing the enforcement of drug laws and the 
public health impact on minority communities). 
 9. The War on Marijuana in Black and White, AM. C.L UNION at 12 (2013), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/1114413-mj-report-rfs-rel1.pdf. 
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medicine.10 Regulating marijuana as an intoxicant did not occur until the end of the 
19th century and start of the 20th century.11  Early criminalization efforts were 
linked to racist campaigns that appallingly asserted that marijuana incited 
minorities to violence and corrupted the moral purity of White Americans.12 By 
1937, the majority of states had banned marijuana and the first federal legislation 
was passed to outlaw marijuana – The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937.13  
The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 did not serve as a direct prohibition of marijuana, 
instead the act created two major tax provisions: an annual occupational tax on 
those dealt with the drug and a tax on transfers of marijuana.14 For the annual 
occupational tax, the rate of taxation varied based on the occupation of the 
individual.15 For example, marijuana importers were taxed $24 a year while 
physicians who prescribed marijuana were taxed at $1 per year.16  The occupational 
tax also required that individuals subject to this tax register with the Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”).17  The transfer tax imposed a one dollar per ounce 
marijuana tax on transfers involving individuals who had registered with the IRS 
under the occupational tax provision.18  If the transferee was not registered with 
the IRS, the tax rate was $100 per ounce of marijuana.19 The federal government 
issued tax stamps to verify payment of the taxes required by this act.20 Transfer of 
marijuana without the tax stamp was illegal and violations of the Marihuana Tax Act 
could result in fines up to $2,000 and/or imprisonment for up to five years.21 Over 
time it became clear that the Marihuana Tax Act was not created for revenue 
generation but was really an instrument for imposing criminal penalties on the 
transfer or possession of marijuana.22 
 
 10. Michael Vitiello, Marijuana Legalization, Racial Disparity, and the Hope for Reform, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 789, 791–92 (2019). 
 11. Id. at 797. 
 12. See id. at 797–800 (discussing racist rhetoric surrounding early efforts to outlaw cannabis); see also 
Matt Thompson, The Mysterious History of ‘Marijuana’, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 22, 2013, 11:46 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2013/07/14/201981025/the-mysterious-history-of-marijuana 
(discussing the public dialog during the early 20th century that linked marijuana use to racist fears of immigrants 
from Mexico and India). 
 13. Vitiello, supra note 10, at 800. 
 14. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937) (repealed 1970). 
 15. Id. at § 2. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at § 7. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551, §7 (1937) (repealed 1970). 
 21. Id. at §§ 8, 12. 
 22. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON L. ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUST., 13, TASK FORCE REPORT: 
NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABUSE (1967), (stating that the Marihuana Tax Act “raises an insignificant amount of 
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The criminalization of marijuana continued to intensify and in 1951 Congress 
passed the Boggs Act, named for the bill sponsor Louisiana Congressman Thomas 
Boggs, Sr.23  The Boggs Act created mandatory minimum sentences for a broad 
spectrum of drug offenses including violation of the Marihuana Tax Act.24  In 
addition, it increased penalties for repeat offenders.25  For example, a first time 
offender of the Marihuana Tax Act was subject to a fine up to $2,000 and 
imprisoned for not less than 2 years or more than 5 years.26  In contrast, the 
penalties for a third offense included a fine up to $2,000 and imprisonment for not 
less than 10 years or more than 20 years.27  After the passage of the Boggs Act, the 
federal government urged states to modify their marijuana legislation so that state 
penalties would conform to the new federal penalties.28  By 1953, 17 states had 
passed legislation, referred to as “little Boggs Acts,” to align their penalty structures 
with the new federal system and by 1956, 11 additional states had enacted stricter 
penalties.29  
The monetary penalties and prison sentences for violations of the Marihuana Tax 
Act were increased again in 1956 when Congress passed the Narcotics Control Act 
of 1956.30  For example, a first time offender for possession of marijuana in violation 
of the Marihuana Tax Act was now subject to a fine up to $20,000 and a mandatory 
prison sentence not less than 2 years or more than 10 years.31  The Narcotics Control 
Act of 1956 also differentiated between possession and distribution marijuana 
crimes, with distribution crimes subject to higher minimum and maximum prison 
sentences.32   
The escalation of criminalization appeared to falter in 1969 when the Supreme 
Court issued its opinion in Leary v. United States.33  In this case, Timothy Leary was 
stopped at the U.S-Mexico border and marijuana was found in his car by a U.S. 
customs inspector.34  One of the charges brought against Mr. Leary was 
transportation and transfer of marijuana without having paid the required transfer 
 
revenue and exposes an insignificant number of marihuana transactions to public view….It has become, in 
effect, solely a criminal law imposing sanctions upon persons who sell, acquire, or possess marihuana.”). 
 23. MARK A.R. KLEINMAN AND JAMES HAWDON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DRUG POLICY 95–96 (Sage 
Publication) (2011). 
 24. An Act to amend the penalty provisions applicable to persons convicted of violating certain narcotic 
laws, and for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 82-225, 65 Stat. 767 (1951). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at § 2. 
 27. Id. 
 28. MARK A.R. KLEINMAN AND JAMES HAWDON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DRUG POLICY 95–96 (Sage Publication) (2011). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Narcotics Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-728, 70 Stat. 567. 
 31. Id. at § 103. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 12 (1969). 
 34. Id. at 10. 
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taxes imposed by the Marihuana Tax Act.35  The Supreme Court struck down this 
conviction because compliance with the Marihuana Tax Act violated Mr. Leary’s 5th 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.36  The court reasoned that if Mr. 
Leary had complied with the transfer tax provisions of the Marihuana Tax Act, he 
would have exposed himself to ‘real and appreciable’ risk of self-incrimination 
because possession of any marijuana was a crime in all 50 states.37  This opinion 
undercut the effectiveness of the Marihuana Tax Act as a tool for marijuana 
criminalization by identifying the 5th Amendment as a full defense to its transfer 
tax provisions. 
However, the regulatory gap left by this decision was quickly filled by Congress 
with the passage of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (“CSA”) which repealed 
and replaced the Marihuana Tax Act.38  The CSA provides the current federal 
framework for regulating marijuana and most states have legislation modeled after 
it.39  The CSA regulates the lawful “manufacture, distribution, and use of controlled 
substances for legitimate medical, scientific, research, and industrial purposes,” 
while preventing the illegal trade in these same substances.40  The statute 
categorizes various plants, drugs and chemicals into one of five schedules based on 
medical use, potential for abuse, and safety.41 Marijuana is a Schedule I substance, 
the most restricted category of substances.42 This means the federal government 
has determined that marijuana has a high potential for abuse, no currently 
acceptable medical use in the United States, and there is a lack of accepted safety 
for the use marijuana even under medical supervision.43  
As a result of its Schedule I status, the unauthorized cultivation, distribution, and 
possession of marijuana is a federal crime.44  The criminal penalties associated with 
the CSA depend on a variety of factors.45  However, a first time marijuana 
possession offense is subject to a minimum $1,000 fine and up to 1 year in prison.46  
 
 35. Id. at 11. 
 36. Id. at 12, 29. 
 37. Id. at 16. 
 38. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat.1236 (1970) (repealing the provisions of the Marijuana Tax Act). 
 39. Todd Garvey et. al., Marijuana: Medical and Retail – Selected Legal Issues, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. at 7 
(Apr. 8, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43435.pdf (identifying the states that have modeled their 
legislation after the federal Controlled Substances Act). 
 40. Id. at 3 (describing the function of the Controlled Substances Act). 
 41. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(a)–(b) (2020) (describing the five classification schedules and the three key 
variables for placement into a schedule). 
 42. See id. § 812(c) (2018) (listing marijuana as a Schedule I substance). 
 43. See id. § 812(b) (defining the qualifying characteristics of a Schedule I substance). 
 44. Id. § 841(a)(1)–(2). 
 45. See generally BRIAN YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30722, DRUG OFFENSES: MAXIMUM FINES AND TERMS OF 
IMPRISONMENT FOR VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT AND RELATED LAWS (2015) (providing an in 
depth of the criminal penalties associated with violations of the Controlled Substances Act). 
 46. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2018). 
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When an individual has at least three possession offenses, these penalties escalate 
to a minimum fine of $5,000 and a prison sentence no less than 90 days and no 
more than 3 years.  The CSA’s penalties for marijuana possession are far less severe 
than the prison terms mandated under the Narcotic Control Act of 1956, which 
imposed a mandatory prison sentence not less than 2 years or more than 10 years 
for first time marijuana possession offenses.47   
The CSA has escalating criminal repercussions for marijuana cultivation, 
distribution, or possession with intent to distribute. These penalties are dependent 
on the amount of marijuana involved as measured by weight or number of plants.48  
The most severe individual penalty for this category of offense includes a fine of up 
to $10 million and at least 10 years and up to life in prison.49  
B. The Strained Relationship between Federal and State Marijuana Laws 
Despite the criminalization of marijuana under federal law, there is a growing 
movement at the state level to decriminalize possession of small amounts of 
marijuana and/or to legalize marijuana for either medical use or adult-recreational 
use.  Currently, twenty-six states and the District of Columbia have decriminalized 
possession of small amounts of marijuana.50  Decriminalization removes the threat 
of jail, with many states treating the possession of a small amount of marijuana as 
a civil infraction.51  For example, in Maryland, possession of less than 10 grams of 
marijuana will result in a civil fine of $100 for the first offense.52 
The trend of legalizing marijuana for medical use began in California with 
Proposition 215, the Compassionate Use Act of 1996.53 Now thirty-three states and 
the District of Columbia have highly regulated medical cannabis programs.54  As a 
result, almost “two-thirds of the United States population – 210 million people –
live in a jurisdiction where medical cannabis use is legal.”55 The legalization of 
marijuana for adult-recreational use is a more recent development that started in 
 
 47. Narcotic Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-728, 70 Stat. 567, (1956). 
 48. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2018) (2018) (explaining the different penalties for possession of different 
amounts of marijuana). 
 49. See id. § 841(b)(1)(A) (providing these penalties for crimes involving 1000 kilograms or more of 
marihuana, or 1,000 or more marihuana plants regardless of weight). 
 50. See MARIJUANA OVERVIEW, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, MARIJUANA OVERVIEW (2019) (discussing the 
state trend of decriminalize small amounts of marijuana). 
 51. Id. 
 52. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 5-601(c)(1)(ii) (West 2017). 
 53. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2003) (legalizing the medical use of marijuana). 
 54. See STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (providing a national survey of state 
medical marijuana programs). 
 55. W.C. Tilburg et al., Emerging Public Health Law and Policy Issues Concerning State Medical Cannabis 
Programs, THE J. OF LAW, MED. & ETHICS 108–11 (citing U.S. Census Bureau, State Population Totals and 
Components of Change: 2010–2017 (2018) as basis for population data). 
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2012 with two successful ballot initiatives in Colorado and Washington.56 Today, 
eleven states and the District of Columbia have legalized recreational use of 
marijuana for adults.57 
How can the majority of states have legal marijuana industries when it is illegal 
under federal law?  Why isn’t the Department of Justice shutting down marijuana 
dispensaries?  The uneasy truce between federal and state cannabis laws is a 
complex issue that involves the interplay of four major legal concepts: (1) 
preemption, (2) the anti-commandeering doctrine, (3) enforcement discretion, and 
(4) appropriations riders.  
1. Preemption 
The preemption doctrine is based on the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, cl.2 of the 
U.S. Constitution.  This provision states that the “Constitution, and the laws of the 
United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
law of the land . . . .”58  As a result of this provision, when federal law and state law 
conflict, the federal standard prevails or preempts the state law.59  
However, preemption of state law requires Congressional intent to supersede 
the laws of state.60  This intent can be derived from the express language of a federal 
law or it can be implied when compliance with federal and state law is impossible 
or when state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishing the objectives of 
Congress.61  The CSA contains express preemption language that states: 
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intent 
on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision 
operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law 
on the same subject matter which would otherwise be within the 
authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict between that 
provision of this subchapter and that State law so that the two cannot 
consistently stand together.62 
 
 56. See DEEP DIVE MARIJUANA, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (discussing changing legal status of 
recreational marijuana). 
 57. See supra note 50. 
 58. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl.2. 
 59. See Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2013) (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid 
Waste Management Assn., 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992)) (“Under the Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption 
doctrine is derived, any state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with 
or is contrary to federal law, must yield.”). 
 60. See Hillman v. Maretta, 569 U.S. 483, 490 (2013) (explaining when preemption of state law occurs). 
 61. Id. 
 62. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012). 
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This language clarifies that Congress wanted states to retain regulatory authority 
over marijuana and that federal law would only preempt state authority when there 
is a “positive conflict.”  
State courts have examined whether a “positive conflict” exists between the CSA 
and state medical marijuana laws that would invalidate legalization efforts.  The 
existing case law largely protects state medical marijuana programs from federal 
preemption.63 In the preemption analysis, courts generally look to see if the state’s 
medical marijuana legislation makes it impossible to comply with the CSA or serves 
as an obstacle to the federal government’s objectives under the CSA.64 For example, 
in Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming, the City, in an effort to prevent its residents from 
cultivating medical marijuana in compliance with state law, argued that Michigan’s 
medical marijuana legislation was preempted by the CSA.65 However, the court held 
that Michigan’s medical marijuana statute was not preempted. First, the court 
reasoned that that it was possible to comply with both statutory schemes because 
Michigan’s law was permissive of marijuana use but did not require behavior that 
was prohibited by federal law and it did not prohibit the federal government from 
enforcing the CSA.66 Second, the court held that Michigan’s medical marijuana 
program was not an obstacle to the CSA’s goals because the “limited state-law 
immunity for [medical marijuana use] does not frustrate the CSA’s operation nor 
refuse its provisions their natural effect, such that its purpose cannot otherwise be 
accomplished. . . . [T]his immunity does not purport to alter the CSA’s federal 
criminalization of marijuana, or to interfere with or undermine federal enforcement 
of that prohibition.”67 
However, the Supreme Court of Colorado found that a provision of state law that 
required law enforcement officers to return seized medical marijuana to a patient 
was preempted by the CSA.68  The court reasoned that returning the seized cannabis 
would be a violation the CSA’s prohibition on the distribution of marijuana.69  This 
legal dynamic created a positive conflict necessitating a preemption of the state law 
 
 63. See e.g., White Mtn. Health Ctr. v. City Of Maricopa, 241 Ariz. 230 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) (legalizing 
medical marijuana despite contrary provisions in the Controlled Substances Act); Cnty. of San Diego v. San Diego 
NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461, 480–81 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that Congress only intended positive conflict 
preemption when the two laws could not “consistently stand together” and that the challenged medical 
marijuana identification provision did not create this type of conflict because it did not relieve an individual 
from federal prosecution); Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming,  846 N.W.2d 531, 537–39 (Mich. 2014) (finding 
Michigan’s medical marijuana program was not preempted by federal law because it did not prevent the federal 
government from enforcing the Controlled Substances Act and the limited immunity provided under state law 
did not frustrate federal efforts to address drug abuse and control the trafficking of controlled substances.). 
 64. Ter Beek, 846 N.W.2d at 537–39. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 537–38. 
 67. Id. at 538–40. 
 68. People v. Crouse, 388 P.3d 39, 42–43 (Colo. 2017). 
 69. Id. 
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requiring the return of the seized medical marijuana.70  In addition, the Oregon 
Supreme Court has held, that to the extent Oregon’s medical marijuana 
identification card provision “affirmatively authorizes the use of medical marijuana, 
federal law preempts that subsection leaving it ‘without effect.’”71  However, the 
court made it clear that this holding applied only to the provisions at issue and did 
not apply to the entire medical marijuana program.72 Despite a mix in state case 
law, state courts have never found preemption to invalidate a state’s marijuana 
legalization efforts entirely. 
A federal court has also addressed, although in dicta, the issue of preemption of 
state marijuana laws in In re: Rent-Rite Super Kegs West LTD.73  In this bankruptcy 
case, the court indicated that a “positive conflict” did not exist because “Colorado 
constitutional amendments for both medical marijuana, and the more recent 
amendment legalizing marijuana possession and usage generally, both make it clear 
that their provisions apply to state law only. Absent from either enactment is any 
effort to impede the enforcement of federal law.”74  In addition, it is important to 
note that the federal government has never asserted in court that the CSA 
preempts state legalization efforts, medical or recreational.75  The Department of 
Justice has even argued for the dismissal of a lawsuit claiming Arizona’s medical 
marijuana law was preempted.76 
2.  Anti-Commandeering Doctrine 
If state marijuana programs are not preempted by the CSA, why hasn’t the federal 
government compelled state legislatures to pass laws that comply with the 
prohibitions of the CSA?  Why hasn’t the federal government required state police 
officers to enforce the prohibitions of the CSA? The federal government’s ability to 
compel these actions is likely prohibited by the 10th Amendment.  The 10th 
Amendment states “powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the 
people.”77  Courts have interpreted this amendment to provide states protection 
from federal efforts to commandeer state legislative and executive function.  
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Emerald Steel Fabricators v. Bureau of Labor and Indus., 230 P.3d 518 (Or. 2010). 
 72. Id. at 526–28. 
 73. In re Rent-Rite Super Kegs, 484 B.R. 799, 805 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2012). 
 74. Id. at 804–05. 
 75. See State Marijuana Regulations Laws Are Not Preempted by Federal Law, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT 
https://www.mpp.org/issues/legalization/state-marijuana-regulation-laws-are-not-preempted-by-federal-
law/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2020) (asserting that the federal government has never argued for preemption of state 
cannabis legalization efforts in court). 
 76. Arizona v. United States, No. CV 11-1072-PHX-SRB, 2012 WL 13059795 at *2 (D. Ariz. Jan 4, 2012). 
 77. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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In New York v. United States, the Supreme Court invalidated a portion of the 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendment Act of 1985 that required states to 
develop legislation for the disposal of all low-level radioactive waste within their 
borders or be forced to take title of the waste.78  The Court reasoned that the 10th 
Amendment protects the sovereignty of state governments and that “Congress may 
not simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly 
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’”79  The Court 
expounded further by explaining:  
No matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution 
simply does not give Congress the authority to require the States to 
regulate. The Constitution instead gives Congress the authority to 
regulate matters directly and to pre-empt contrary state regulation. 
Where a federal interest is sufficiently strong to cause Congress to 
legislate, it must do so directly; it may not conscript state governments 
as its agents.80 
The Court found that either option, legislate pursuant to federal mandate or be 
forced to assume title of toxic waste , would “‘commandeer’ state governments into 
the service of federal regulatory purposes, and would for this reason be inconsistent 
with the Constitution’s division of authority between federal and state 
governments.”81  This precedent likely extends to any federal effort aimed at forcing 
state legislatures to pass marijuana policies that are more in line with the CSA.   
More recently, in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, the 
Supreme Court invalidated the Professional Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 
which prohibited states from legalizing sports betting if the practice was banned in 
their state at the time of the legislations enactment.82  The Court reasoned that the 
“provision at issue here—prohibiting state authorization of sports gambling—
violates the anti-commandeering rule. That provision unequivocally dictates what 
a state legislature may and may not do. . . . It is as if federal officers were installed 
in state legislative chambers and were armed with the authority to stop legislators 
from voting on any offending proposals. A more direct affront to state sovereignty 
is not easy to imagine.”83  This holding bolsters the protections offered by the 10th 
Amendment and is especially relevant to states that have yet to legalize medical or 
recreational marijuana, but are considering authorizing these policies in the future.  
 
 78. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 79. Id. at 161 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). 
 80. Id. at 178. 
 81. Id. at 175. 
 82. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
 83. Id. at 1478. 
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Murphy appears to proscribe efforts from the federal government to prohibit these 
legalization efforts. 
State executive resources are also protected under the 10th Amendment. In 
Printz v. United States, the Court ruled provisions in the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act that required state and local law enforcement to conduct 
background checks on prospective purchasers violated anti-commandeering 
protections.84 The Court admonished the federal government’s efforts to 
appropriate law enforcement resources by concluding  
[t]he Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the 
States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, 
or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal 
regulatory program. It matters not whether policymaking is involved, 
and no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; 
such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional 
system of dual sovereignty.85 
This precedent likely extends to any federal effort to conscript state resources 
into the enforcement of the CSA. As a result, the federal government must use its 
own resources to enforce the CSA’s prohibitions on marijuana.  
3. Enforcement Discretion   
Even when individuals cultivate, distribute, or use marijuana in compliance with 
their state’s laws, they are still in violation of the CSA. As discussed above, the 
responsibility for pursuing these violations falls to federal law enforcement. This 
creates a challenge since federal enforcement resources are finite.  In response to 
this challenge, the federal government has issued memos delineating the 
enforcement priorities for the Department of Justice (“DOJ”).   
The first critical memorandum (“Ogden Memo”) was issued on October 19, 2009, 
by Deputy Attorney General David  W. Ogden.86  The Ogden Memo was issued to 
provide United States Attorneys with “uniform guidance to focus federal 
investigations and prosecutions” in light of state efforts to legalize medical 
marijuana.87  The document indicated that while the DOJ was committed to 
enforcing the CSA in all states, it was also committed to “making efficient and 
rational use of its limited investigative and prosecutorial resources.”88  The 
 
 84. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 85. Id. at 935. 
 86. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM FOR SELECTED UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS: INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS 
IN STATES AUTHORIZING THE MEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA (2009). 
 87. Id. at 1. 
 88. Id. 
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memorandum identified the prosecution of significant illegal drug traffickers and 
the disruption of illegal drug manufacturing and trafficking networks as the DOJ’s 
core priorities.  However, the Ogden Memo instructed United States Attorneys to 
deprioritize individuals “whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance” 
with existing state medical marijuana laws.89  
In 2013, the DOJ released another critical memorandum, the Cole Memo, to 
update enforcement priorities in response to Colorado and Washington’s 
legalization of recreational marijuana.90  The Cole Memo noted that Congress had 
identified marijuana as a dangerous drug and that the illegal marijuana trade 
provided significant revenue to dangerous criminal enterprises.91 The memo went 
on to state that the DOJ was committed to utilizing its limited resources to address 
the significant threats posed by the illegal marijuana trade.92  To guide enforcement 
resources towards addressing the most significant threats, the Cole Memo 
identified the following eight activities as priorities:  
(1) preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors; (2) preventing 
revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, 
gangs, and cartels; (3) preventing the diversion of marijuana from states 
where it is legal under state law to other states; (4) preventing state-
authorized marijuana activity from being used as a cover for the 
trafficking of other illegal drugs or other legal activities; (5) preventing 
the use of violence or firearms in the cultivation of and distribution of 
marijuana; (6) preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other 
adverse public health consequences associated with marijuana use; (7) 
preventing the growing of marijuana on public lands; and (8) preventing 
marijuana possession or use on federal property.93  
To place these priorities in the context of state medical and recreational 
marijuana programs, the memo indicated that states with strong and effective 
regulatory schemes were less likely to threaten the enumerated enforcement 
priorities.94  However, the memorandum also warned that if state regulatory 
 
 89. Id. at 1–2. 
 90. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM FOR ALL UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS: GUIDANCE REGARDING MARIJUANA 
ENFORCEMENT (2013). 
 91. Id. at 1. 
 92. Id. at 1. 
 93. Id. at 1–2. 
 94. See id. at 3 (explaining how jurisdictions that have legalized marijuana while implementing strong 
regulations regarding the cultivation, distribution, sale, and possession of marijuana are less likely to threaten 
the federal enforcement priorities). 
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systems were ineffective in addressing these issues, the federal government would 
bring enforcement actions focused on these harms.95 
Since the Ogden and Cole memos are an expression of the governing 
administration enforcement policies, they can change as the policies of the 
administration change or if a new administration assumes power.  As a result, any 
stability they provide to state marijuana programs and the cannabis industry is 
precarious.  This was evident when President Trump appointed Jeff Sessions as 
Attorney General.  On January 4, 2018, Attorney General Sessions issued an 
enforcement memorandum (“Sessions Memo”) that rescinded the Ogden and Cole 
Memos and instructed federal prosecutors “to weigh all relevant considerations, 
including federal law enforcement priorities set by the Attorney General, the 
seriousness of the crime, the deterrent effect of the criminal prosecution, and the 
cumulative impact of the particular crimes on the community.”96  
Lawmakers from states with legal marijuana programs and the cannabis industry 
reacted to the Sessions Memo with alarm and fear.97 Rep. Earl Blumenauer (D-Ore.), 
railed against the memorandum by stating that “‘[g]oing against the majority of 
Americans — including a majority of Republican voters — who want the federal 
government to stay out of the way is perhaps one of the stupidest decisions the 
Attorney General has made.’”98  Fear of federal prosecution loomed again, 
highlighting the tension between the CSA and state marijuana policies. However, 
little action was taken by the federal government after the issuance of the Sessions 
Memo and the memo may have galvanized additional support for the legalization 
of marijuana.99  One year after the issuance of the Sessions Memo, a marijuana 
policy expert describe it as “more like thunder than lighting” and explained that the 
memo “spooked a lot of businesses, investors, and elected officials and elicited 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM FOR ALL UNITED STATES 
ATTORNEYS: MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT (2018). 
 97. See Laura Jarrett, Sessions Nixes Obama-era Rules Leaving States Alone That Legalize Pot, CNN (Jan. 4, 
2018, 5:44 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/04/politics/jeff-sessions-cole-memo/index.html (discussing 
the political backlash created by the insurance of the Sessions Memo); see also Brad Auerbach, How Cannabis 
Entrepreneurs Feel About Sessions’ Reversal of The Cole Memo, FORBES (Mar. 3, 2018, 7:32 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bradbradauer/2018/03/03/how-cannabis-entrepreneurs-feel-about-sessions-
reversal-of-the-cole-memo/#3e5205c7c4ae (delineating industry concerns regarding the uncertainty the 
Sessions Memo creates and the chilling effect it will have on investments in the cannabis industry). 
 98. Josh Gerstein & Cristiano Lima, Session Announces End to Policy That Allowed Legal Pot to Flourish, 
POLITICO (Jan. 4, 2018, 9:31 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2020/01/04/jeff-sessions-marijuana-policy-
us-attorney-enforcement-324020. 
 99. Kyle Jaeger, One Year After Jeff Sessions Rescinded a Federal Marijuana Memo, The Sky Hasn’t Fallen, 
MARIJUANA MOMENT (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.marijuanamoment.net/one-year-after-jeff-sessions-rescinded-
a-federal-marijuana-memo-the-sky-hasnt-fallen/. 
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responses that had real world ramification…[b]ut ultimately there was never any 
noticeable change in the federal enforcement of marijuana prohibition laws.” 100 
With the appointment of William Barr as Attorney General, federal marijuana 
enforcement policies appear to have reverted to pre-Sessions priorities.101 While 
Barr has indicated his disapproval of marijuana and of the conflict between federal 
and state law, he has indicated that the DOJ will follow the Cole Memo.102  Again, 
this change in policy highlights the unstable nature of the protection provided to 
the cannabis industry by federal enforcement discretion. 
4. Appropriations Rider 
Since 2014, Congress has passed an appropriations rider that prevents the DOJ from 
using any of their funding to prevent states from “implementing their own laws that 
authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.”103  
The appropriations rider has been interpreted to protect individuals engaged in 
conduct permitted by state medical marijuana laws, as well as the state efforts to 
implement medical marijuana programs.104  However, individuals are only 
protected by the appropriations rider when they are in strict compliance with the 
medical marijuana laws of their states.105 While the appropriations rider provides 
another layer of protection from federal prosecution, it is also an unstable 
protection because it must be renewed every year with the appropriations bill.  It 
also critical to note that it does not prohibit the DOJ from taking enforcement 
actions against state recreational marijuana programs.   
The legal principles of preemption, anti-commandeering, enforcement 
discretion, and appropriations restrictions together create the uneasy balance that 
allows states to administer marijuana programs despite the prohibitions of the CSA. 
 
 100. Id. (quoting Mason Tvert of the Marijuana Policy Project). 
 101. Jeff Smith, Congressional Legislation Reintroduced to Protect State-Legal Marijuana Markets, 
MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (Apr. 4, 2019), https://mjbizdaily.com/congressiocon-legislation-reintroduced-protect-
state-legal-marijuana/ (discussing Attorney General Barr’s priorities for enforcement of federal marijuana 
laws). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128 Stat. 2217 § 538 
(2014); Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 115-31, 131 Stat. 135, § 537 (2017) (renewing marijuana 
appropriations rider for 2017); Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348 § 538 (2018) 
(renewing marijuana appropriation rider for 2018); Consolidated Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 116-93, 133 
Stat. 13 § 531 (2019); H.R. 1158, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019). 
 104. See, e.g., United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining how the DOJ is 
prohibited from spending appropriation act funds to prosecute individuals for conduct permitted by State 
Medical Marijuana Laws). 
 105. Id. at 1178. 
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II.  INEQUITABLE ENFORCEMENT OF DRUG LAWS AND THE IMPACT ON MINORITY 
COMMUNITIES 
The war on drugs has devastated minority communities, especially those that are 
majority African American.  The inequitable enforcement of federal and state drug 
policies has resulted in disturbing arrest and incarceration trends and stripped 
government entitlements from vulnerable individuals. To gain perspective on these 
inequitable law enforcement practices, the prevalence of drug use amongst racial 
groups needs to be examined first. 
A.  Drug Use Statistics 
The National Survey on Drug Use and Health, a study conducted by the Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration within the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, provides interesting insight into drug use across racial 
groups.  The research looks at several metrics but data on illicit drug use within the 
past year and lifetime drug use is especially illuminating. 
1. 2018 
In 2018, the study revealed that 20.2% of White Americans had used illicit drugs in 
the past year compared to 20.8% of African Americans, and 17.1% of Hispanic or 
Latino Americans.106  This data reveals comparable drug use rates amongst Black 
and White Americans and slightly lower use amongst Hispanic or Latino Americans.  
However, a different picture is revealed when lifetime drug use is examined. The 
National Survey on Drug Use and Health reveals that 54.5% of White Americans 
identified as having used illicit drugs compared to 45.9% of African Americans and 
37.7% of Hispanic or Latino Americans.107  When looking at marijuana use 
specifically, the data is comparable. The study indicates that 16.5% of White 
Americans had used marijuana in the past year compared to 17.8% of African 
Americans, and 13.6% of Hispanic or Latino Americans.108  With regards to lifetime 
use of marijuana, 50.7% of White Americans identified as having used marijuana 
compared to 42.4% of African Americans and 33.0% of Hispanic or Latino 
Americans.109  This data reveals that Hispanic and Latino Americans utilize drugs less 
in all metrics.  Whites and Blacks have comparable drug use when surveyed about 
their behavior within the past year, but Whites are more likely to use drugs over the 
course of their lifetime. 
 
 106. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERV. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., RESULTS FROM THE 2018 
NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE & HEALTH: DETAILED TABLES, TABLE 1.23B (2018). 
 107. Id. at table 1.22B. 
 108. Id. at table 1.26B. 
 109. Id. at table 1.25B. 
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2. 2010 
These statistics have not changed considerably in the past decade.  The 2010 
National Survey on Drug Use and Health revealed that illicit drug use was similar 
across all three racial categories when looking at use within the past year; White 
Americans at 15.3%, African Americans at 15.9%, and Hispanic or Latino Americans 
at 14.9%.110  When looking at lifetime use, White Americans again displayed the 
highest rate of illicit drug use at 50.9% compared with 45.1% of African Americans 
and 37.2% of Hispanic or Latino Americans.111 The 2010 marijuana use statistics for 
use within the past year are comparable for each racial category: 11.6% of White 
Americans, 13.7% of African Americans, and 10.6% of Hispanic or Latino 
Americans.112  However, the 2010 statistics mirrored the most recent data by 
revealing that White Americans were more likely to have used marijuana in their 
lifetime with 45.9% indicating use compared with 40.6% of African Americans and 
30.6% of Hispanic or Latino Americans.113 The 2010 data reveals that Hispanic and 
Latino Americans utilize drugs less in all metrics, Whites and Blacks have 
comparable drug use when look at use within the past year, but Whites are more 
likely to use drugs over the course of their lifetime.   
B.  Convictions and Arrests 
1.  General Incarceration Data 
The most recent federal figures show that 1,489,363 people were imprisoned in 
state and federal correctional facilities.114 For context, this prison population is 
larger than the population of Dallas, Texas, which has a population of 1,345,047.115  
The racial composition of the U.S. prison population provides a glimpse into the 
impact of inequitable criminal law enforcement policies. The Bureau of Justice 
Statistics (“BJS”) tracks the race of prisoners who have been sentenced to at least 
one year in prison; this accounts for 97% of the prison population or 1,439,808 of 
sentenced prisoners.116 Of this subsection of prisoners, 30.3% are White (436,500), 
33% are Black (475,900), and 23.4% are Hispanic (336,500).117 This must be 
juxtaposed to the racial breakdown of the U.S Population, which is 60.4% White, 
 
 110. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERV. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., RESULTS FROM THE 2010 
NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE & HEALTH: DETAILED TABLES, TABLE 1.19B (2011). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at table 1.24B. 
 113. Id. 
 114. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ252156, PRISONERS IN 2017 (2019). 
 115. Quick Facts Dallas City, Texas, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/dallascitytexas (last visited Feb. 1, 2020). 
 116. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 114, at 5–6. 
 117. Id. at 6. 
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13.4% Black, and 18.3% Hispanic or Latino.118 The imprisonment rate statics 
elucidate this inequity further.  The imprisonment rate for black men is 2,336 per 
100,000 people, for Hispanic men it is 1,054 per 100,000, and for white men it is 
397 per 100,000.119 In other words, black men are imprisoned at a rate almost six 
times that of white men and Hispanic men are imprisoned at a rate of 2.7 times that 
of their white counterparts.120  The numbers are even worse for black men ages 18 
to 19, who are twelve times more likely to be imprisoned than their white 
counterparts.121 
2.  Incarceration Data for Drug Crimes 
To examine the imprisonment statistics specific to marijuana is a challenge. BJS 
tracks imprisonment for drug offenses but does not delineate the specific drug 
involved in the crime.122  BJS also categorizes prisoners by their most serious 
offense.123  This practice has the potential to underrepresent the number of people 
in prison with a drug conviction because they will be tracked for their most serious 
convicted offense, e.g., homicide.  However, even with these limitations, the data 
provides important insight.  Nearly half of all federal prisoners (47.3%) were serving 
time for a drug offense.124  Of the 78,800 prisoners with a drug offense as their most 
serious crime, 22% were White (17,300), 37% were Black (29,000), and 39% were 
Hispanic (31,000).125  
In state correction facilities, prisoners whose most serious offense is a drug crime 
represent a smaller percentage of the state prison population at 14.7%.126  
However, since state correction facilities house the majority of the nation’s prison 
population, this 14.7% represents 190,100 prisoners.127  The racial breakdown of 
these prisoners is 32.4 % White (61,600), 30.4 % Black (57,900), and 20.3% Hispanic 
(38,600).128 
The racial breakdown of incarceration rates for drug crimes, at both the federal 
and state level, should raise concerns given the racial composition of the country as 
 
 118. Quick Facts United States, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 
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a whole (60.4% White, 13.4% Black, and 18.3% Hispanic or Latino).129  This concern 
should be compounded when considered in the context of drug use statistics that 
show that more Whites use illegal drugs in the course of their lifetime than Blacks 
or Hispanics.130  When Black Americans represent 13.4% of the population but 37% 
of federal prisoners and 30.4% of state prisoners convicted of drug crimes, it is clear 
that the law is not being equitably enforced. 
3. Arrest Data and the Effect of State Legalization of  Marijuana 
While prison statistics do not track convictions for marijuana offenses, there is data 
on marijuana arrests that reaffirms racial bias in enforcement. A study of marijuana 
arrests conducted by the American Civil Liberties Union revealed that on average 
Blacks were on 3.7 times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than 
Whites.131 However, several states trended far beyond the average.132  For example, 
in Iowa, Blacks were 8.3 times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession 
than Whites.133 
With the growing state trend of marijuana legalization, there is evidence that 
marijuana arrests are decreasing.134 Colorado recorded a 46% drop in marijuana 
arrests in the years following legalization.135  However, racial disparities persist 
despite the overall decline.  The number of marijuana arrests decreased by 51% for 
Whites, 33% for Hispanics, and 25% for Blacks.136 In Alaska, marijuana arrest rates 
decreased dramatically post legalization at a rate of 95% for Blacks and 92% for 
Whites.137 However, in 2016, Black Alaskans were ten times more likely to be 
arrested than their White counterparts.138 This is a significant change from 2012, 
when they were less than twice as likely to be arrested for a marijuana crime.139  As 
data regarding the effects of marijuana legalization becomes available, it reveals 
that despite a decrease in overall arrests, racial inequity persists in the enforcement 
of the law.140 
 
 129. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 115. 
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C. Loss of Government Benefits and the Impact on Food Security 
The inequitable enforcement of drug laws and creates problems for communities 
of color long after an individual’s release from prison. One of these challenges arises 
from a federal law, the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (“PRWORA”).141  PRWORA bans convicted drug felons from 
receiving Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) benefits.142 SNAP, 
formerly known as food stamps, is the largest nutrition program in the country and 
provides low-income individuals with financial assistance to pay for food.143 In 2019, 
SNAP spent over 58 million dollars to help feed over 34 million Americans.144  
As discussed in Part II (B) of this paper, African Americans and Hispanic 
Americans are disproportionately targeted by law enforcement with regards to 
drug laws.  As a result, African Americans and Hispanic Americans are more likely to 
be impacted by the SNAP drug felon ban.  This problem is exacerbated by the fact 
that Black Americans and Hispanic Americans experience food insecurity, limited 
access to adequate food caused by a lack of money and other resources, at much 
higher rates than their white counter parts.145 Research shows that 8.1 % of White 
households are food insecure, compared to 21.2% of Black households and 16.2% 
of Hispanic households.146 By negatively impacting food security, the SNAP drug 
felon ban exposes ex-offenders to a broad spectrum of health problems, including 
an increased risk for hypertension, diabetes, obesity, and depression.147 
Unfortunately, the Drug felony ban has the potential to impact the food security 
of the ex-offender’s family as well.  SNAP benefits are distributed to a household 
and are based on the income and number of people living in the household.148  
 
 141. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, §115, 
110 Stat 2105, 2180 (1996). 
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When an ex-offender is subject to the ban they are excluded from the calculation 
of their household’s benefit.149 For example, if the ex-offender lives in a SNAP 
household that includes four people that household is restricted to the benefits 
afforded a three person household. In this example, the family’s benefits could be 
decreased up to $137 per month.150  This challenge is exacerbated because 
PRWORA considers the ex-offender’s income to be part of the household income 
despite the fact they excluded from household count.151  This has the potential of 
raising the net-income of the household, which would reduce the value of the SNAP 
allotment. In conjunction these two provisions force a household to survive on less 
benefits.   
Also, research indicates that access to public assistance greater reduces the risk 
of recidivism in ex-offenders.152  Drug offenders who are eligible for SNAP at the 
time of release from prison experience a 13.1% decrease in recidivism.153  
PRWORA’s drug felon ban clearly destabilizes an already vulnerable populations as 
they attempt to reintegrate into broader society. 
Given, the drastic public health implications of the drug felon ban, it is important 
to note that PRWORA contained a provision that allowed states to opt out of or 
modify the ban.154  Fortunately, the vast majority of states have chosen to do so.155  
Currently, 22  states and D.C. have opted out the ban completely and 27 states have 
modified the ban.156  Requiring parole compliance or participation in a drug 
treatment program as a prerequisite for receiving SNAP benefits are the most 
common modifications. However, some states disqualify ex-offenders permanently 
after multiple separate convictions, others make a distinction between possession 
and distribution crimes, while a few create a limited ineligibility period linked to the 
 
Maximum-Allotments-Deductions.pdf (providing maximum value of SNAP benefits for SNAP households based 
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date of conviction or release from incarceration.157 South Carolina is the only state 
that still has not opted out the ban.158  
Although states have taken steps to ameliorate its impact, PRWORA’s drug felon 
ban is another vehicle that perpetuates the harms caused to minorities by the 
inequitable enforcement of drug policies. 
III.  STATE EFFORTS TO INCREASE REPRESENTATION IN THE LEGAL MARIJUANA 
INDUSTRY 
A. Race and the Legal Marijuana Industry 
As states change their policies toward medical and recreational marijuana, a flood 
of new financial opportunities arises. The legal cannabis industry was valued at 
$10.4 billion in 2018 and employs almost 300,000 people.159  As the industry grows 
and more states adopt marijuana legalization measures, the value of this industry 
is expected to reach $30 billion by 2025.160  Unfortunately, communities of color 
are missing out on this cannabis boom.  These are the same communities that have 
suffered through inequitable enforcement of drug laws and have been stripped of 
vital government entitlements because of America’s War on Drugs. A recent survey 
revealed that 81% of marijuana business owners and founders are White, while 19% 
identified as a minority (5.7% Hispanic, 4.3% African-American, 2.4% Asian, and 
6.7% identified as other).161  However, it is important to note that these statistics 
reflect individuals with ownership interest in a business, not necessarily a 
controlling share. As a result, the number of marijuana businesses in which there is 
a racial minority with a controlling interest is likely much lower than 19%.  
One of the major barriers to diversity in the marijuana industry is the high startup 
cost associated with establishing a marijuana business.  One estimate indicated that 
the average startup cost (application fees, licensing fees, etc.) for a retail location 
in the recreational market is $312,000 and $500,000 for a cannabis processing 
business.162  These startup estimates do not include the capital requirement placed 
on marijuana businesses by the state, funds the business must have on hand to 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See Flaccus supra, note 4 (indicating that the legal cannabis industry was valued at $10.4 billion in 
2018);see also Bruce Barcott, Special Report: Cannabis Jobs Count, LEAFLY 1, 2 (2019), 
https://d3atagt0rnqk7k.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/01141121/CANNABIS-JOBS-REPORT-
FINAL-2.27.191.pdf. 
 160. Iris Dorbian, New Cannabis Report Predicts Legal Sales to Reach $30 Billion by 2025, FORBES (Sep. 24, 
2019, 8:21 AM),  https://www.forbes.com/sites/irisdorbian/2019/09/24/new-cannabis-report-predicts-legal-
sales-to-reach-nearly-30-billion-by-2025/#18fb65aa1121 (reporting projections for legal cannabis sales for 
2025). 
 161. See MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY, supra note 7, at 10. 
 162. Id. at 9. 
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prove financial viability.163  For example, Pennsylvania’s medical marijuana program 
requires that applicants for grower/processor permits have at least $2 million in 
capital, $500,000 of which must be deposited in financial institutions.164  For a 
dispensary, the requirement is $150,000 deposited with financial institutions.165   
These high buy-in costs form a barrier to minority participation in the marijuana 
industry because of the contours of poverty in the United States.  The median 
income for a White household was $70,642 in 2018; by comparison, Black 
households averaged $41,361 and Hispanic households $51,450.166 To reiterate this 
disparity, 9% of White Americans live below the federal poverty line compared to 
22% of Black Americans and 19% of Hispanic Americans.167  This economic disparity 
is magnified in the legal cannabis industry.  Since marijuana remains illegal under 
federal law, the vast majority of banks and credits unions will not provide services 
to cannabis businesses.168 As a result, the vast majority of marijuana businesses are 
self-funded with 84% of businesses utilizing the founder’s savings to launch the 
business, while only 1% of business were able to secure a bank or state agency 
loan.169 
The lack of minority-owned cannabis businesses has the potential to stifle 
minority employment opportunities throughout the industry. Research indicates a 
strong racial bias exists in hiring practices. One study revealed that on average, 
White applicants received 36% more callbacks than equally qualified African 
American applicants and 24% more than equally qualified Latino applicants.170  
Another study revealed that resumes with “white sounding names” received 
callbacks at a 50% higher rate than resumes with “African American sounding 
names.”171   
 
 163. Id. 
 164. 28 PA. CODE § 1141.30 (2018). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Income and Wealth in the United States: An Overview of Recent Data, PETER G. PETERSON FOUND. (Oct. 4, 
2019), https://www.pgpf.org/blog/2019/10/income-and-wealth-in-the-united-states-an-overview-of-data 
(citing data from the United States Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2019 Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement). 




 168. MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY, supra note 7, at 10–11 (explaining the challenges of financing the startup of a 
marijuana business). 
 169. Id. 
 170. LINCOLN QUILLIAN ET AL., META-ANALYSIS OF FIELD EXPERIMENTS SHOWS NO CHANGE IN RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING 
OVER TIME, PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 10871 (Douglas S. Massey ed., 2017). 
 171. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and 
Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 9873, 2003). 
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The racial biases of ownership and management contribute to the disparate 
employment opportunities available to minorities. Research has repeatedly shown 
that white employers are more likely to hire white employees and minority 
employers are more likely to hire minority employees.172  One study of small 
businesses revealed that 57.8% of white owned firms employed no minority 
employees, while 93.5% of Black firms had a workforce that was made up of at least 
50% minority employees.173 Another report indicated that 76% of all employees in 
black-owned firms were black, 16% were white.174  In contrast, this report found 
that the workforces at white-owned firms were only 29% black.175 The reality of 
these hiring practices emphasizes the importance of minority ownership and 
management within the cannabis industry.  Without minority representation at the 
highest level, minorities will have limited access to job opportunities throughout 
the entire industry. 
States have started to adopt legal policies focused on encouraging a more 
inclusive cannabis industry.  This challenge has been met with two complimentary 
categories of interventions.  The first category of interventions focuses on creating 
space for smaller businesses in the cannabis industry by preventing the 
consolidation of market share by larger entities.  The second category of 
interventions focuses on increasing minority owned businesses and minority 
employment in the cannabis industry.   
B. Preventing Market Consolidation and Creating Space 
State legislators and regulators that impose licensing restrictions may be motivated, 
in part, to prevent the creation of “Big Marijuana,” a market in which only a few 
large companies control the production and sale of marijuana. Policymakers may 
seek to use legislation and regulation to establish fertile ground for non-traditional, 
smaller entities to enter the marijuana industry. This may be done by limiting the 
number of licenses available, limiting the number of licenses an individual or entity 
may own, and restricting ownership to only one or two types of license.176 While all 
 
 172. See e.g. Michael A. Stoll et al., Black Job Applicants and the Hiring Officer’s Race, 57 INDUS. & LAB. REL. 
REV. 267, 267 (2004) (discussing how black managers are more likely to hire black employees than white hiring 
managers); see also Laura Giuliana et al., Manager Race and the Race of New Hires, 27 J. OF LAB. & ECON. 589, 
589–631 (2009) (concluding that the race of a hiring manager in a retail establishment effects the hiring 
practices of the establishment with regards to race. Concluding that white managers are less likely to hire black 
employees than black hiring managers). 
 173. Timothy Bates, Utilization of Minority Employees in Small Business: A Comparison of Nonminority and 
Black-Owned Urban Enterprises, 23 REV. OF BLACK POL. ECON. 113, 117 (1994). 
 174. Thomas D. Boston, The Role of Black-Owned Businesses in Black Community Development, in JOBS AND 
ECON. DEV. IN MINORITY COMMUNITIES 163 (Paul Ong & Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris eds., 2006). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Danna Thomas, License Quotas and the Inefficient Regulation of Sin Goods: Evidence From the 
Washington Recreational Marijuana Market (Nov. 15, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3312960. 
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states with medical or adult-use laws regulate licensing in some respect, looking at 
a few examples across the states demonstrates some of the different approaches 
to restrictions that may encourage involvement of non-traditional, smaller 
businesses.  
First, states limit the number of licenses available typically for licensees that 
grow or process marijuana; lesser restrictions exist for licenses for 
retailers/dispensaries. For example, Maryland permits the licensing of at most 22 
growers and 28 processors, with no restriction on the number of dispensary 
licenses;177 Pennsylvania limits to 25 growers/processors and, initially, to 50 
dispensaries;178 and West Virginia limits to 10 growers and 10 processors, allowing 
100 dispensaries.179 Limiting the top of the chain licenses may contribute to entry 
of non-traditional, smaller entities and organizations into the industry, particularly 
when these quantity restrictions are coupled with the equity preferences discussed 
below. Without license quantity limitations, large corporations (“Big Marijuana”) 
are likely to acquire grower and/or processor licenses in each state as they are far 
more capable of paying for a license and navigating the licensing process than non-
traditional, smaller entities. Barring antitrust limitations, the impact in that scenario 
could be the creation of an oligopoly of sorts, with smaller businesses incapable of 
competing with the big businesses that can suffer losses for a period of time in order 
to shutter competitors that lack a deep well to draw on. States may limit the 
number of licensees for a variety of reasons, including keeping the market small 
enough to regulate tightly, and that may inure to the benefit of non-traditional, 
smaller entities in the license marketplace. 
With no restrictions on the number of licenses available, California sought to 
allow the entry of smaller businesses by giving them a head start. According to a 
lawsuit by the California Growers Association,180 Proposition 64,181 creating the 
California adult-use marijuana market, was designed to give small and mid-sized 
businesses five years in operation before larger businesses would be permitted to 
secure licenses. Yet “by allowing individuals or companies to hold an unlimited 
number of small cultivation licenses, the [State] effectively violat[ed] the initial five-
 
 177. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 13-3306(a)(2)(i) (West 2020) (governing growers); id. at § 13-3307(f) 
(West 2020) (governing dispensaries); id. at b§ 13-3309(c)(1)(i) (West 2020) (governing processors). 
 178. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 10231.616 (2016). 
 179. W. VA. CODE § 16A-6-13 (2020). 
 180. Complaint at 2, California Growers Association v. California Department of Food and Agriculture (2018) 
(No. 34-2018-00225874-CU-MC-GDS), 2018 WL 3970458. 
 181. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11018 note J (West 2020) 
(“The Adult Use of Marijuana Act ensures the nonmedical marijuana industry in California will be built around 
small and mediumsized businesses by prohibiting large-scale cultivation licenses for the first five years. The 
Adult Use of Marijuana Act also protects consumers and small businesses by imposing strict anti-monopoly 
restrictions for businesses that participate in the nonmedical marijuana industry.”). 
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year prohibition on large cultivations.”182 Without a limit on the number of licenses, 
large companies were able to secure a large portion of the “small” cultivator 
licenses, capitalizing on economies of scale and decreasing the competitiveness of 
smaller businesses.183 Limiting the number of licenses for cultivators could have 
avoided this outcome and allowed for the voters’ intent to be realized—entry into 
the market of small and medium sized businesses.184 
Other limitations can also contribute to broader access to licenses for non-
traditional, smaller entities. Limiting the number of licenses available coupled with 
limiting the number of licenses that one entity may hold can open the market. For 
example, West Virginia,185 Maryland,186 and Pennsylvania187 allow an entity to have 
only one grower or processor license so that each such license is owned by a 
separate entity. Pennsylvania limits to five the number of dispensaries one entity 
may own.188 Illinois law is unique in that the ownership limitations seek to limit 
license ownership by one entity more deeply. With respect to large growers 
(cultivation centers), Illinois provides that “[n]o person or entity shall hold any legal, 
equitable, or beneficial interest, directly or indirectly, of more than  cultivation 
centers.”189 Similarly, an individual or entity may hold interest in only one craft 
(small) grower, and a craft grower license may not be issued to an individual or 
entity with more than 10% interest in a cultivation center.190 An individual or entity 
may hold interest in at most 10 dispensaries.191 These detailed limitations avoid the 
common machinations of industry, creating several different entities with disparate 
ownership in each but some level of common ownership across all. That is, 
essentially, what happened with the small cultivator licenses in California.192 
 
 182. Eli McVey, Chart: Handful of Growers hold Hundreds of Cultivation Licenses in California’s Legal 
Marijuana Market, MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (Jun. 18, 2018), https://mjbizdaily.com/chart-handful-growers-hold-
hundreds-cultivation-licenses-california-legal-marijuana-market/. 
 183. Less than 2 years into the 5-year window, “3,535 cultivation licenses had been issued to 1,607 unique 
license holders, meaning that the average licensee holds approximately two licenses apiece. The top 10 license 
holders in the state control 646 licenses – or an average of 65 each.” Id. 
 184. Ultimately the decision of whether the State acted in violation of Proposition 64 and related statutes 
and regulations has been left undecided. The California Growers Association dropped the lawsuit in January 
2019 after a change in leadership of the Association. Scott Rodd, Growers Association drops Lawsuit Against 
State over Permitting Large-Scale Cannabis Cultivators, SACRAMENTO BUS. J. (Jan. 22, 2019), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/sacramento/news/2019/01/22/growers-association-drops-lawsuit-against-
state.html. 
 185. W. VA. CODE § 16A-6-13(a) (2020). 
 186. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 13-3309(d) (West 2020) (regulating processors). 
 187. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 10231.616(4) (2016) (regulating growers and processors). 
 188. Id. at (3). 
 189. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/30-30 (2019). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See McVey, supra note 182. 
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Limiting ownership to one license per business, like West Virginia, Maryland, and 
Pennsylvania, may open the door to smaller businesses. Limiting ownership to the 
degree provided in Illinois law may be even more effective in preventing larger 
business entities from securing all or most of the available licenses and, equally 
important, prevents large businesses from creating separate entities to secure 
licenses, behavior that may be possible under less strict licensing limitations in 
other states. Efforts to minimize the number of licenses an entity may own likely 
inures to the benefit of non-traditional, smaller business entities.193 
States also restrict ownership of different types of licenses, particularly seeking 
to avoid vertical integration where one business holds a license for each step from 
growing to processing to selling at retail. In Michigan, a marijuana safety 
compliance facility or secure transporter may not also hold a license as a grower, 
processor, retailer, or microbusiness.194 A marijuana microbusiness licensee may 
not also hold any other marijuana business license.195 Pennsylvania permits only up 
to five growers to also hold a dispensary license.196 “The rationale against vertical 
integration is that it will prevent the firm from evolving into a politically and 
financially powerful firm. Furthermore, vertical integration will crowd out small and 
new players to the industry.”197 
Pushback against vertical integration occurred in Florida when growers sued the 
State to prevent implementation of regulations that allowed for vertical integration 
of the marijuana market. The First District Court of Appeals found that the statute 
passed to implement the constitutional amendment that gave rise to Florida’s 
medical marijuana program mandated vertical integration in contrast with the 
 
 193. Patrick Murphy & John Carnevale, Regulating Marijuana in California, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL. 1, 11 (Apr. 
2016), https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_416PMR.pdf (“Placing limits on the number of 
production licenses an individual or organization can own would make it easier for small business to operate in 
the market.”). 
 194. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.27959(3)(d) (2018). 
 195. Id. The law is quite the opposite in West Virginia, where the statute explicitly states that “[a] person 
may hold a grower permit, a processor permit, and a dispensary permit, or any combination thereof, 
concurrently.” W. VA. CODE ANN § 16A-6-13(9) (2020). 
 196. 35 PA. STAT. AND CONST. STAT. ANN. § 10231.616(5) (Lexis 2019). That number changes to 20% of the 
growers/processors if the state expands the number of grower/processors from the initially established 25. Id. 
 197. Karen A. Parker, et. al, Risk Management Within the Cannabis Industry: Building a Framework for the 
Cannabis Industry, 28  WILEY FIN. MKTS. INST. & INST. 30 (2019), 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/fmii.12104. See also Murphy & Carnevale, supra note 193, 
at 22 (“[I]f the regulatory objective is to encourage wider participation in the marijuana industry, horizontal 
integration may be preferable. A horizontally structured industry could be designed to favor small businesses, 
while a vertically integrated industry might result in fewer businesses controlling the industry.”); Fred 
Hernandez, Horizontal and Vertical Integration Affect the Cannabis Industry, LEAFBUYER (Oct. 17, 2018), 
https://www.leafbuyer.com/blog/horizontal-vertical-integration/ (“For many investors, vertical integration in 
the cannabis industry allows for massive scale but can risk creating cannabis monopolies.”). 
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amendment passed by voters.198 While the case works its way through the judicial 
system, evidence of the impact of vertical integration supports the conclusion that 
small companies are left out when vertical integration is left in: As of December 
2019, 6 companies own 75% of the 205 dispensaries in Florida.199 
States are eager to open the marijuana industry to non-traditional, smaller 
businesses. Licensing restrictions can minimize the monopolizing effect of Big 
Marijuana and allow for entry by smaller businesses. Yet more is needed to be sure 
that these points of entry are actually accessible by those against whom the war on 
drugs has raged for generations. Social equity provisions, coupled with these 
licensing restrictions, should allow for minority-owned businesses to become part 
of the marijuana industry. 
C. Social Equity Measures to Increase Inclusivity 
Once space has been created for smaller business entities to participate in the 
marijuana industry, measures to increase inclusivity are added to enhance minority 
representation.  In evaluating these social equity measures, six major categories of 
interventions were identified: license application preference, special license 
opportunities, training and support services, financial services, fee waivers, and 
licensee equity requirements. The population targeted by each of these 
interventions varies from state to state, but broadly speaking these social equity 
measures target individuals and communities that were disproportionately 
impacted by the war on drugs, which as discussed in Part II of this paper, places a 
focus on minority communities.200 In the discussion of each of these interventions, 
the paper will focus on key variations to highlight the spectrum of approaches 
utilized by states. 
 
 198. Fla. Dep’t of Health v. Florigrown LLC, No. 1D18-4471, 2019  WL 2943329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 9, 
2019), review granted, 2019 WL 5208142 (Fla. Oct. 16, 2019). 
 199. Manuel Madrid, Florida Officials Make “Same Old” Argument for Restricting Medical Marijuana 
Licenses, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.miaminewtimes.com/marijuana/vertical-integration-
court-case-pits-florida-officials-against-medical-marijuana-operators-11326113, citing FLA. HEALTH: OFF. OF MED. 
MARIJUANA USE (Dec. 6, 2019), https://s27415.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/ommu_updates/2019/120619-
OMMU-Update.pdf. 
 200. See e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT ANN. 705/1-10 (West 2019) (defining social equity applicant as businesses 
with owners and employees that have lived in disproportionately impacted areas); see also id. (defining 
disproportionately impacted area as a census tract or comparable geographic area that is impoverished and 
has high rates of arrest, conviction, and incarceration for cannabis related crimes); see also id. (defining 
impacted family member as a parent, legal guardian, child, spouse, or dependent, or was a dependent of an 
individual who was arrested for convicted of, or adjudicated delinquent of certain drug offenses prior to the 
passage of the Illinois Cannabis and Regulation and Tax Act). 
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1. License Application Preference 
To function as a legal cannabis business in any of the states that have legalized 
recreational or medical marijuana, a business must be licensed by the state 
government.201  To increase representation within the cannabis industry some 
states have adopted policies that provide preferential review of the license 
applications submitted by social equity applicants, either in scoring of the 
application in a capped system or a system for expedited review.  There has also 
been a failed attempt to utilize racial quotas in the issuance of marijuana business 
licenses.   
a.  Preferential Scoring-Maryland 
The Maryland Medical Cannabis Commission (“MMCC”) has adopted regulations 
that incorporate social equity considerations into the application process for 
grower, processor, and dispensary licenses. Since Maryland has capped the number 
of business licenses awarded in its medical cannabis program,202 each license 
application is evaluated based on six factors.203 While these factors vary slightly 
depending on the type of license, each application standard includes a social equity 
metric. These social equity considerations are referred to as “additional factors” 
and are afforded 15% weight in the evaluation of the application.204 For example, 
the medical cannabis grower license application utilizes the following weighted 
criteria: 
Operational factors afforded 20% weight; 
Safety and security Factors afforded 20% weight; 
Commercial horticulture or agriculture factors afforded 15% weight; 
Production control factors afforded 15% weight; 
Business and economic factors afforded 15% weight; and 
Additional factors afforded 15% weight.205 
 
 201. See e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 13-3306 (West 2019) (creating a cannabis growers license 
requirement); see also id.. § 13-3309 (creating a cannabis processors license requirement); see also id. § 13-
3307 (creating dispensary license requirement). 
 202. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 13-3306(a)(2) (West 2019) (creating a cannabis growers license cap); 
see also id. § 13-3309(c) (creating a cannabis processors license cap); see also id. § 13-3307(a) (tasking the 
Maryland Medical Cannabis Commission with setting the dispensary license cap based on state demand for 
medical cannabis). 
 203. See MD. CODE REGS. 10.62.08.05 (2019) (providing application review standards for cannabis grower 
license); see also id. 10.62.19.04 (providing application review standards for cannabis processor license); see 
also id. 10.62.25.05 (providing application review standards for cannabis dispensary license). 
 204. See MD. CODE REGS. 10.62.25.05 (2019). 
 205. Id. 10.62.08.05 (providing application review standards for cannabis grower license). 
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The additional factors/social equity factors are the same for each category of 
license and include four social equity variables upon which the applicant is 
evaluated.206   
The first variable is the applicant’s diversity plan.207 The diversity plan is the 
business’s “detailed written plan, including objectives, timetables, and evaluation 
metrics that describes the steps applicant will take to ensure that a business will 
promote the meaningful inclusion of diverse groups.”208 Regulations dictate the 
contents of the diversity plan. For example, the diversity status of each owner, 
investor, employee, and contractor, internal numerical diversity goals, and a plan 
for diversity-related outreach.209 
The second variable is disadvantaged equity applicant ownership status.210 To 
qualify as a disadvantaged equity applicant, an individual must be a member of an 
identified minority group, which includes African Americans, American 
Indians/Native Americas, Asians, Hispanics, and women. Also, the individual’s 
personal net worth must be less than $1,713,333, adjusted for inflation, or they 
must be a disadvantaged owner of a certified minority business enterprise as 
defined in State Finance Procurement Article §14-301(d).211 In the evaluation of 
disadvantaged equity applicant ownership status, the benchmark is majority 
ownership (at least 51 %) or good faith efforts to have a majority ownership interest 
held by disadvantaged equity applicants.212 
The third variable is ownership by the most disadvantaged groups in the medical 
cannabis industry, as identified by the MMCC.213  This variable is a subset of the 
disadvantaged equity applicant pool and is limited to African American and 
American Indian/Native American applicants.214  The evaluation of this variable is 
 
 206. See id. 10.62.08.05 (providing application review standards for cannabis grower license); see also id. 
10.62.19.04 (providing application review standards for cannabis processor license); see also id. 10.62.25.05 
(providing application review standards for cannabis dispensary license). 
 207. MD. CODE REGS. 10.62.25.05 (2019). 
 208. Id. 10.62.01.01(B) (12). 
 209. Id. 
 210. See id. 10.62.08.05 (2019) (providing application review standards for cannabis grower license); see 
also id. 10.62.19.04 (providing application review standards for cannabis processor license); see also id. 
10.62.25.05 (providing application review standards for cannabis dispensary license). 
 211. MD. CODE REGS. 10.62.01.01(B) (10). 
 212. See id. 10.62.08.05 (providing application review standards for cannabis grower license); see also id. 
10.62.19.04 (providing application review standards for cannabis processor license); see also id. 
10.62.25.05(providing application review standards for cannabis dispensary license). 
 213. See MD. CODE REGS. 10.62.08.05 (providing application review standards for cannabis grower license); 
see also id. 10.62.19.04 (providing application review standards for cannabis processor license); see also id. 
10.62.25.05 (providing application review standards for cannabis dispensary license). 
 214. See Affidavit of Certification of Member of the Most Disadvantaged Groups in the Med. Cannabis Indus., 
MD. MED. CANNABIS COMMISSION, 
https://mmcc.maryland.gov/Documents/2019GrowerLicenseApplications/Attachment%20E%20-
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broken into two benchmarks: (1) 25 to 50% ownership interest held by members of 
the most disadvantaged groups and (2) at 51% ownership interest held by members 
of the most disadvantaged group.215  In addition to achieving these benchmarks, 
the application review also considers the applicant’s good faith efforts to achieve 
these metrics.216 
The fourth evaluation variable is related to economically disadvantaged areas217 
and household income levels of the applicant’s ownership.218  To meet this 
evaluation metric an applicant must demonstrate three or more of the following 
criteria: 
At least 51 percent of its ownership interest is held by one or more 
individuals who have lived in an economically disadvantaged area for 5 
of the preceding 10 years; 
A majority of the current employees live in an economically 
disadvantaged area; 
A majority of the current contractors live in an economically 
disadvantaged area; 
At least 51 percent of its ownership interest is held by one or more 
individuals who are a member of a household that earns no more than 
80 percent of the State median household income; and 
The applicant has significant past experiences in or business practices 
that promote economic development and empowerment in 
economically disadvantaged areas.219 
By providing up to 15% of the license applications score for these social equity 




%20(Grower).pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2020). 
 215. See MD. CODE REGS. 10.62.08.05 (2019) (providing application review standards for cannabis grower 
license); see also id. .62.19.04 (providing application review standards for cannabis processor license); see also 
id. 10.62.25.05 (providing application review standards for cannabis dispensary license). 
 216. See MD. CODE REGS. 10.62.25.05 (2019). 
 217. See id. 10.62.01.01(B)(13) (defining an economically disadvantaged area as a geographic area, 
identified by the Maryland Medical Cannabis Commission, which meets at least three of the following criteria: 
(1) a median income is 80 % or less of the average median household income for the state, (2) an unemployment 
rate that is at least 150 % of the unemployment rate in the state, (3)  a health uninsured rate that is at least 150 
% of the uninsured rate in the state, (4)a  Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Plan rate that is at least 150 % of 
the state rate for this program and (5) a poverty rate that is at least 150 % of the poverty rate for the state). 
 218. See id. 10.62.08.05 (providing application review standards for cannabis grower license); see also id. 
10.62.19.04 (providing application review standards for cannabis processor license); see also id. 10.62.25.05 
(providing application review standards for cannabis dispensary license). 
 219. MD. CODE REGS. 10.62.25.05 (2019). 
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b. Expedited Review-Massachusetts 
As part of its recreational marijuana program, Massachusetts grants priority review 
of marijuana establishment license applications to Economic Empowerment Priority 
Applicants.220  Economic Empowerment Priority Applicants are parties that 
demonstrate three of the following criteria. 
A majority of ownership belongs to people who have lived for five of the 
preceding ten years in an Area of Disproportionate Impact, as determined by the 
Commission;  
A majority of ownership has held one or more previous positions where 
the primary population served were disproportionately impacted, or 
where primary responsibilities included economic education, resource 
provision or empowerment to disproportionately impacted individuals 
or communities; 
At least 51% of current employees or subcontractors reside in Areas of 
Disproportionate Impact and by the first day of business, the ratio will 
meet or exceed 75%;  
At least 51% or employees or subcontractors have drug-related CORI and 
are otherwise legally employable in Cannabis enterprises;  
A majority of the ownership is made up of individuals from Black, African 
American, Hispanic or Latino descent; and  
Other significant articulable demonstration of past experience in or 
business practices that promote economic empowerment in Areas of 
Disproportionate Impact.221  
Critical to these applicant parameters is the definition of “Area of 
Disproportionate Impact.” This term refers to the 29 cities with the highest 
historical rates of arrest, conviction, and incarceration related to marijuana 
crimes.222 Applicants that meet the Economic Empowerment Priority Applicant 
criteria have their applications reviewed before noncertified applications.223   
 
 220. See 935 MASS. CODE REGS. 500.002 (2019) (defining a marijuana establishment as a “Marijuana Cultivator 
(Indoor or Outdoor), Craft Marijuana Cooperative, Marijuana Product Manufacturer, Marijuana Microbusiness, 
Independent Testing Laboratory, Marijuana Retailer, Marijuana Transporter, Delivery-only Licensee, Marijuana 
Research Facility, Social Consumption Establishment or any other type of licensed Marijuana-related business, 
except a Medical Marijuana Treatment Center (MTC)”). 
 221. See id. (defining an Economic Empowerment Priority Applicant). 
 222. See id. (defining Area of Disproportionate Impact); see also Guidance for Identifying Areas of 
Disproportionate Impact, CANNABIS CONTROL COMMISSION https://mass-cannabis-control.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/FINAL-DRAFT-Areas-of-Disproportionate-Impact-1.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2020) 
(identifying the 29 communities that qualify as Areas of Disproportionate Impact). 
 223. See 935 MASS. CODE REGS. 500.102(2) (2019) (explaining the priority review process). 
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Since Massachusetts has not capped the number of marijuana establishment 
licenses, this expedited review provides a competitive advantage because it allows 
Economic Empowerment Priority Applicants to enter the marketplace faster; but 
does not prevent other applicants from receiving a license.  
c. Racial Quotas-Ohio 
In an attempt to increase representation of minorities in its medical marijuana 
industry, Ohio passed legislation that required that at least 15% of the cultivator, 
processor, and testing laboratory licenses be awarded to entities that are owned 
and controlled by members of an economically disadvantaged group.224 Ohio 
defined economically disadvantaged group for this program to include Blacks or 
African Americans, American Indians, Hispanics or Latinos, and Asians who were 
U.S. citizens and residents of Ohio.225  However, this provision was found to be 
unconstitutional in Pharmacann Ohio, LLC v. Williams.226 In this case, the plaintiff 
argued that they were denied equal protection under the law, as required by U.S. 
Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.227  Plaintiffs asserted that they were denied 
equal protection under the law because Ohio had denied their license application 
even though they scored higher than economically disadvantaged applicants who 
were awarded licenses under the racial quota requirement.228 
Since the statute at issue included racial classifications, the court utilized strict 
scrutiny to evaluate its constitutionality.229 Under this review, there are two prongs 
of examination: (1) the government must have a compelling interest for utilizing 
racial classifications, and (2) the means used to achieve this interest must be 
narrowly tailored to achieving this goal.230  The court found that the state failed 
both prongs of the strict scrutiny review.231  First, Ohio asserted that the State had 
a compelling interesting in “redressing past and present effects of racial 
discrimination within its jurisdiction….”232 The court recognized that remedying past 
and present racial discrimination could qualify as a compelling government 
interest.233 However, to find a compelling interest there must be strong evidence to 
support that state’s intervention.234  The Court held that Ohio did not have strong 
 
 224. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3796.09(C) (West 2019). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Pharmacann Ohio, LLC v. Williams, No. 17 CV 10962, at *9 (Ohio Com. Pl 2018). 
 227. Id. at *2. 
 228. See id. at *2–3 (discussing application scoring). 
 229. Id. at *4. 
 230. Id. at 5–6 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986)). 
 231. Id. at *12–13. 
 232. Pharmacann, No. 17 CV 10962 at *7. 
 233. Id. 
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enough evidence to justify the legislature’s actions because the only evidence 
considered prior to the passage of the provision were marijuana arrest rates and 
the State lacked any evidence of discrimination in the legal marijuana industry.235   
To determine if a racial classification is narrowly tailored, courts must consider 
several factors including the efficacy of alternative remedies; the flexibility and 
duration of the relief; the relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor 
market; and the impact of the provision on third parties.236 The Court found that an 
evaluation of these factors indicated that the license quota was not narrowly 
tailored.237 First, the State did not consider any race-neutral alternatives to the 
license quotas which cut against the validity of the provision.238 Second, the court 
found the provision to be inflexible because the 15% license quota was a strict 
percentage and did not have a set duration for how long it would be in effect. 239 
Third, the Court held that the 15% license set aside had no relationship to the 
magnitude of discrimination in the relevant labor market and appeared to be 
“selected at random by the legislature, and not based on the evidence provided.”240 
Fourth, the contested provision had significant impact on third parties and the 
burden created by the license quota was excessive in a new industry with limited 
licenses.241  For these reasons, the court found that the contested provision was not 
narrowly tailored.242  Without a narrowly tailored intervention to a compelling 
government interest, the court held that the license quotas were 
unconstitutional.243 Explicit racial quotas must pass such a high bar that no other 
states have been as direct as Ohio in attempting to create a diverse marijuana 
industry. 
2. Special License Opportunities 
The creation of a special category of marijuana business license that is only available 
to social equity applicants is an intervention employed by a minority of states.  
These exclusive opportunities attempt to create entry points into the legal cannabis 
industry without the high startup costs of traditional licensing opportunities, e.g., 
cultivator licenses, processor licenses, and dispensary licenses. 
 
 235. See id. at *8–9 (evaluating the sufficiency of the state’s evidence and stating that the evidence must 
show racial discrimination in the particular industry to warrant government intervention). 
 236. Id. at *13 (quoting United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) for the legal standard). 
 237. Id. at *20. 
 238. Pharmacann, No. 17 CV 10962 at *14. 
 239. Id. at *15. 
 240. Id. at 16–17. 
 241. Id. at *17–18. 
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a. Colorado-Accelerator Licenses 
In 2019, Colorado passed legislation which created two new categories of marijuana 
business licenses: accelerator cultivators and accelerator manufacturers.244 To 
secure an accelerator license, a person must have resided in a census tract 
designated by the Colorado Office of Economic Development and International 
Trade as an Opportunity Zone for five of the ten years prior to application.245  
Opportunity Zones are designated low-income communities; investment in these 
communities receives favorable federal tax treatment under the Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act of 2017.246   
The accelerator license allows the licensee to work out of an established 
marijuana cultivator or manufacture’s premises.247  This is intended to address the 
high entry cost of securing appropriate facilities for a new licensee. In addition, the 
established business, which is referred to as the “Accelerator-Endorsed Licensee,” 
can provide technical and capital support to the accelerator licensee.248  The 
program essentially functions as a mentorship or apprenticeship program. In 
addition, to encourage established businesses to serve as Accelerator-Endorsed 
Licensees, the legislation allows the regulating agency to create an incentive system 
that may include reduced license fees.249   
For most of Colorado’s cannabis licenses, individuals with a felony conviction 
cannot apply for a license within three years of their conviction or while subject to 
a sentence, including probation and parole, for a felony conviction.250  However, for 
the accelerator licenses, a marijuana conviction cannot be the sole basis of 
denial.251 The Colorado Department of Revenue has started the rulemaking process 
for the accelerator license system and more information on this program should be 
forthcoming.252 
 
 244. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 44-10-103 (2019) (describing new accelerator license categories). 
 245. Id. 
 246. See 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-1 (2018) (describing the designation process for Opportunity Zones). 
 247. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 44-10-602, 44-10-603 (2019). 
 248. See id. § 44-10-103 (defining Accelerator-Endorsed Licensee); see also id. §§ 44-10-602, 44-10-603 
(providing for the provision of technical and capital assistance). 
 249. Id.  §§ 44-10-602, 44-10-603. 
 250. Id. § 44-10-307(1)(g). 
 251. Id. 
 252. See Work Group Announcement, COL. DEP’T OF REV., (Sept. 13, 2019) 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/190814%20SB224%20Accelerator%20Work%20Group%
20Announcement.pdf; see also Accelerator Program Workgroup Materials, COL. DEP’T OF REV., (Sept. 13, 2019), 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/190913%20Accelerator%20Work%20Group%20Material
_Final.pdf. 
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b. Massachusetts – Delivery-Only and Social Consumption 
Establishment Licenses 
The Massachusetts Cannabis Control Commission (“MCCC”) recently created two 
special licensing opportunities for social equity applicants. The first special license 
is the new Delivery-only License which allows a business to deliver marijuana and 
marijuana products directly to consumers from a marijuana retailer or a medical 
marijuana treatment center.253  This new license opportunity is offered exclusively 
to Economic Empowerment Priority Applicants and Social Equity Program 
Participants for the first 24 months.254 The MCCC may extend this exclusivity period 
if the objective of increasing representation in the regulated marijuana industry by 
“people from communities that have previously been disproportionately harmed 
by Marijuana prohibition and enforcement of the law has not been met.”255  
The Social Consumption Establishment Pilot Program creates a special license 
that allows a business to sell marijuana and marijuana products for onsite 
consumption.256 This new license is offered exclusively to a select group of 
applicants, which includes Economic Empowerment Priority Applicants and Social 
Equity Program Participants, for the first 24 months.257 Again, the MCCC may extend 
this exclusivity period if the objective of increasing representation in the regulated 
marijuana industry by “people from communities that have previously been 
disproportionately harmed by Marijuana prohibition and enforcement of the law 
has not been met.”258  
In addition to providing the benefit of an exclusivity period for these new 
marijuana business licenses, the Commonwealth has also tried to address the 
potential financial barriers created by the application and annual license fees.  Both 
the Delivery-only and the Social Consumption Establishment license are subject to 
a $1,500 application fee and a $10,000 annual license fee.259  This is the same fee 
structure imposed on marijuana retail establishments, marijuana product 
manufactures, and outdoor marijuana cultivators with between 30,001 and 40,000 
 
 253. 935 MASS. CODE REGS. 500.050(10) (2019). 
 254. See id. (providing the 24-month exclusivity period for Economic Empowerment Priority Applicants and 
Social Equity Program Participants); see also id. 500.002 (defining Economic Empowerment Priority Applicant 
as license applicants that meet several variables intended to increase representation in the cannabis industry 
by those disproportionately affected by the war on drugs); see also id. 500.105(17)v(providing that the Social 
Equity Program Participants are individuals that have lived in areas disproportionately impacted by the war on 
drugs, have a drug conviction, or are related to an individual with a drug conviction. These individuals have 
access to special business support services through the state to facilitate their participation in the legal 
marijuana industry). 
 255. 935 MASS. CODE REGS. 500.105(17) (2019). 
 256. Id. 500.050(6). 
 257. Id. 500.050(6) (b). 
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square feet of marijuana canopy.260 However, the Commonwealth has waived the 
application fee and cut the annual license fee in half for Social Equity Program 
Participants and Economic Empowerment Priority Applicants.261 
3. Trainings and Support Services 
To facilitate the creation of an inclusive marijuana industry, many states offer 
special trainings and support services to social equity applicants and licensees.  The 
training and services are intended to help businesses navigate the complex 
regulatory landscape of the marijuana industry and provide skills critical to 
successfully establishing and maintaining a marijuana business.  
For example, when Michigan legalized adult-use marijuana, the legislature 
mandated that the Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs 
(“LARA”) create “a plan to promote and encourage participation in the marihuana 
industry by people from communities that have been disproportionately impacted 
by marihuana prohibition and enforcement and to positively impact those 
communities.”262  The regulations passed to enact this mandate do not address the 
details of this plan, but indicate that LARA will publish information to address: 
selection criteria to identify disproportionally impacted communities, the list of 
communities that qualify under this criteria, and special services available to license 
applicants from these communities.263  To date, LARA has not released a 
comprehensive plan but has been providing details regarding their Social Equity 
Program through press releases on the agency’s website.264 
To identify disproportionally impacted communities, LARA considered two 
variables (1) marijuana-related convictions and (2) poverty rates. 265 Specifically, 
LARA selected counties in which marijuana–related convictions exceeded the state 
average and in which more than 30% of the population lived below the federal 
poverty rate.266 Initially, 19 counties were selected.267  However, LARA has 
expanded the program to 41 communities as of October 2, 2019.268   
 
 260. Id. 
 261. 935 MASS. CODE REGS. 500.005(1)(b) (2019). 
 262. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.27958(1)(j) (2018). 
 263. MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 23.2 (2019). 
 264. Michigan’s Marijuana Regulatory Agency Announces Social Equity Program Details, MICH. DEP’T OF 
LICENSING & REG. AFF. (July 18, 2019), https://www.michigan.gov/lara/0,4601,7-154-89334_79571_79784-
502157—,00.html (providing initial information on the Social Equity Program). 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
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 268. See Press Release, Mich. Dep’t of Licensing & Reg. Aff., Mich.’s Marijuana Reg. Agency Announces Soc. 
Equity Program Expansion (Oct. 2, 2019) https://www.michigan.gov/lara/0,4601,7-154-89505-508912—
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Applicants that have resided in one of the identified communities for the last five 
years have access to additional business services from the State.269  LARA is 
conducting educational outreach sessions in these disproportionally impacted 
communities.270 At these sessions, LARA provides information on the application 
and licensure process.271  In addition, LARA offers one-on-one application assistance 
and connects social equity applicants with additional state and private sector 
resources. 272 These resources are intended to help social equity applicants run a 
viable marijuana business. For example, the Michigan Department of Treasury 
offers guidance on tax requirements and tax payments and the Michigan Bureau of 
Fire Services offers help with pre-licensure inspections.273 
Massachusetts also provides trainings and technical services for participants in 
its Social Equity Program.274 The program offers a broad range of services that 
include management, recruitment, and employee trainings; accounting and sales 
forecasting; legal compliance; marijuana industry best practices; and assistance 
with identifying or raising funds or capital.275 
While Illinois’ new marijuana legislation tasks its Department of Commerce and 
Economic Opportunity with developing a program that will provide technical 
assistance to Social Equity Applicants, it also includes an interesting educational 
resource.276 Illinois has created a Community College Cannabis Vocational Pilot 
Program.277  The Illinois Department of Agriculture is tasked with working in 
coordination with the Illinois Community College Board to create and administer a 
certificate program that trains individuals to work in Illinois’ legal cannabis 
industry.278 
4. Financial Services 
As discussed earlier, the high start-up costs associated with the marijuana industry 
serve as a financial barrier to forming an inclusive industry.  This challenge is 
 
 269. Id. (discussing Social Equity Program eligibility); see also Social Equity Program Application, MICH. DEP’T 
OF LICENSING & REG. AFF., 
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compounded by the fact that banks are reluctant to provide financial services to 
marijuana businesses because marijuana is a Schedule I substance and criminalized 
under federal law.279 For example, banks that provide financial services to a 
marijuana business can incur criminal liability for money laundering.280  Under 18 
U.S.C. §1956, banks that engage in financial transactions involving the proceeds of 
an unlawful activity, e.g. the proceeds of marijuana sales, can face fines up to 
$500,000 or twice the value of the transaction, whichever is greater, and/or 
imprisonment up to twenty years.281  In addition, banks that work with marijuana 
businesses run the risk of losing their deposit insurance coverage.282 
In response to the lack of financial services, Illinois created the Cannabis Business 
Development Fund to provide low-interest rate loans and grants to assist Social 
Equity Applicants gain entry to, and successfully operate in, the State’s regulated 
marijuana marketplace.283  To qualify as a Social Equity Applicant the business must 
meet one of the following three criteria: (1) at least 51% ownership and control by 
one or more individuals who have resided for at least 5 of the preceding 10 years in 
a Disproportionately Impacted Area; (2) an applicant with at least 51% ownership 
and control by one or more individuals who have been arrested for, convicted of, 
or adjudicated delinquent for certain drug crimes or the member of an impacted 
family; or (3) have at least 10 full-time employees, at least 51% of whom live in a 
Disproportionately Impacted Area or have been arrested for, convicted of, or 
adjudicated delinquent for certain drug crimes or the member of an impacted 
family.284 For the purposes of this program, a Disproportionately Impacted Area is 
a census tract or comparable geographic area that is impoverished and has high 
rates of arrest conviction, and incarceration for cannabis related crimes.285 To meet 
the poverty element the community must meet at least one of four metrics: (1) a 
poverty rate of at least 20%; (2) 75% or more of children qualify for the federal free 
lunch program; (3) at least 20% of households receive Supplemental Nutrition 
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Assistance Program benefits; or (4) an unemployment rate that is 120% of the 
national average for the proceeding two calendar years.286  
The Cannabis Business Development Fund received an initial infusion of 
$12,000,000 from the State.287 The Fund will also be supported by fees collected in 
connection with the early approval licensing process for dispensing organizations 
and cultivation organizations.288  This early approval process grants priority licensing 
in the adult use program to dispensaries and cultivation centers that are in good 
standing with the State’s medical marijuana program.289  As part of this priority 
licensing process, these businesses must pay into the Cannabis Business 
Development Fund.290  For example, a cultivation center seeking an early approval 
license must make a nonrefundable payment of 5% of their total sales from June 1, 
2018 to June 1, 2019 or $750,000, whichever is less, but not less than $250,000 into 
the Cannabis Business Development Fund.291   
5. Fee Waiver 
Fee waivers are another intervention states utilize to address the financial barriers 
to an inclusive marijuana industry.  While the concept itself is straight forward, the 
structure and mechanics of these waivers vary considerably amongst states.  As 
mentioned earlier, Massachusetts simply waives all application fees and 50% of 
annual license fees for Social Equity Program Participants and Economic 
Empowerment Priority Applicants.292 By comparison, Michigan takes a more 
intricate approach to calculating fee waivers. Michigan grants up to a 60% reduction 
to the application fee, initial license fee, and future license renewal fees to 
participants in their Social Equity Program whose businesses will be located in 
disproportionately impacted communities.293  The fee reduction is calculated by 
looking at three factors. First, applicants who have resided in one of the 
disproportionately impacted communities for the past five years receive a 25% fee 
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reduction.294 Second, an additional 25% reduction is awarded if the individuals 
holding majority ownership have been residents of one of the disproportionately 
impacted communities for the past five years and have a marijuana-related 
conviction.295  Third, an additional 10% reduction is granted if the individuals 
holding majority of ownership have resided in a disproportionally impacted 
community for the past five years and were registered as primary caregivers in the 
State’s medical marijuana program for at least two years between 2008 and 
2017.296 A primary caregiver is “a person who is at least 21 years old and who has 
agreed to assist with a patient’s medical use of marihuana and who has not been 
convicted of any felony within the past 10 years and has never been convicted of a 
felony involving illegal drugs or a felony that is an assaultive crime. . . .”297  This 
definition appears to limit this 10% discount to applicants without a conviction or a 
marijuana-related misdemeanors.  
Illinois’ fee waiver is not available to wealthy Social Equity Applicants.298 Illinois 
offers a 50% reduction of any nonrefundable license application fee, any 
nonrefundable fees associated with purchasing a license to operate a cannabis 
business establishment, and any surety bond or other financial requirements for 
certain Social Equity Applicants.299 However, a Social Equity Applicant may not have 
interests in more than 2 other cannabis establishment licenses in Illinois.300 Illinois 
also places an income limitation that requires an “applicant, including all individuals 
and entities with 10% or greater ownership and all parent companies, subsidiaries, 
and affiliates, ha[ve] less than a total of $750,000 of income in the previous calendar 
year.”301 
D. Licensee Equity Requirements 
In addition to focusing on diversity in the ownership of marijuana businesses, states 
are adopting measures to promote diversity in the industry’s workforce. As 
discussed earlier, 81% of marijuana business owners are white.302  This, coupled 
with the established racial hiring biases that result in white owners and managers 
being more likely to hire white employees, stifles employment opportunities for 
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minorities in the marijuana industry.303 To combat this dynamic several states have 
adopted diversity plan requirements.304  These laws require applicants for a 
marijuana business to submit a diversity plan with their license application.305 For 
example, in Massachusetts, an applicant must provide a detailed summary of the 
measures they will utilize to promote equity among minorities, women, veterans, 
and people with all gender identities and sexual orientations in the operation of the 
establishment.306 Similarly, Illinois requires applicants to provide a document that 
outlines the “goal of diversity in ownership, management, employment, and 
contracting to ensure diverse participants and groups are afforded equality of 
opportunity.”307 
IV. STATE EFFORTS TO USE CANNABIS TAX REVENUE TO REINVEST IN COMMUNITIES 
DISPROPORTIONATELY AFFECTED BY THE WAR ON DRUGS 
With legalization of marijuana sales comes revenue. While it is beyond the scope of 
this paper to assess the tax and other economic benefits states reap from allowing 
and taxing marijuana sales, two states have included provisions in their adult-use 
laws that direct some of the tax windfall to communities impacted by the historic 
and persistent disparate enforcement of drug laws. The Illinois adult-use law 
created the Restore, Reinvest, and Renew (“R3”) Program,308 funded by marijuana 
taxes,309 and the Massachusetts adult-use law310 established the similarly funded 
Marijuana Regulation Fund.311 Because both funds are nascent, their impact on the 
relevant communities cannot yet be measured. But there is value in a jurisdiction 
establishing such a fund at the time of legalization; it is far easier to get legislators 
to establish a fund before monies start flowing than to divert monies that are 
already flowing into a state. And it is certainly easier to create programs to assist 
communities when a direct funding source is available. 
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Illinois created the R3 Program when the legislature passed the state’s adult-use 
law in June 2019. The R3 Program is intended: 
(1) to directly address the impact of economic disinvestment, violence, 
and the historical overuse of criminal justice responses to community 
and individual needs by providing resources to support local design and 
control of community-based responses to these impacts; 
(2) to substantially reduce both the total amount of gun violence and 
concentrated poverty in [Illinois];  
(3) to protect communities from gun violence through targeted 
investments and intervention programs, including economic growth and 
improving family violence prevention, community trauma treatment 
rates, gun injury victim services, and public health prevention activities;  
(4) to promote employment infrastructure and capacity building related 
to the social determinants of health in the eligible community areas.312 
These are laudable goals. As explained above, certain communities, particularly 
those populated by a majority of lower income people of color, have been 
devastated by enforcement of drug laws. Recognizing these impacts and creating a 
fund to serve those communities is a positive step toward reducing the effect of 
decades of disparate enforcement and impact. Illinois’ focus on economic 
development, prevention of violence, and creation of employment speaks directly 
to the social determinants of health touted by the public health community.313 
Addressing these factors can create deep, sustainable improvements throughout a 
community.314 Of course, the devil is often in the details. And there is much to be 
revealed in the Illinois details as the State implements the R3 Program starting in 
2020. 
First, the State must identify communities that may receive funding through the 
R3 Program. In January 2020, the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority 
(“ICJIA”), responsible for implementing the R3 Program,315 announced areas that 
have been approved as eligible for R3 Program grants.316 These are areas that are 
 
 312. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/10-40(a) (2019). 
 313. Samantha Artiga & Elizabeth Hinton, Beyond Health Care: The Role of Social Determinants in Promoting 
Health and Health Equity, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (MAY 10, 2018), https://www.kff.org/disparities-policy/issue-
brief/beyond-health-care-the-role-of-social-determinants-in-promoting-health-and-health-equity/. 
 314. Id. 
 315. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/10-40(b) (2019) (stating that this work is done in coordination with the Justice, 
Equity, and Opportunity Initiative of the Lieutenant Governor’s Office). 
 316. ILL. CRIM. JUST. INFO. AUTHORITY, ICJIA ANNOUNCES STATEWIDE AREAS ELIGIBLE FOR RESTORE, REINVEST, AND RENEW 
(R3) PROGRAM GRANTS (Jan. 12, 2020), https://www2.illinois.gov/IISNews/21029-
ICJIA_Announces_Statewide_Areas_Eligible_for_R3_Program_Grants_.pdf; see also Areas Eligible for R3 
Program Grants,  ILL. CRIM. JUST. INFO. AUTHORITY https://icjia.illinois.gov/r3/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2020). 
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“high need, underserved, disproportionately impacted by historical disinvestment, 
and ravaged by violence as indicated by the highest rates of gun injury, 
unemployment, child poverty rates, and commitments to and returns from the 
Illinois Department of Corrections.”317 Now the work is handed off to the Restore, 
Reinvest, and Renew Board (“the Board”) created by the legislature.318 The Board is 
comprised of an array of individuals, including representatives from state and local 
government, organizational representatives or individuals who serve the 
community in various ways, experts in violence reduction, and individuals who have 
been incarcerated.319 Notably, the Board is comprised of eight governmental 
representatives and ten non-governmental representatives. The Board’s primary 
responsibility is to solicit proposals for funding and award grants that will be used 
to address “economic development, violence prevention services, re-entry services, 
youth development, and civil legal aid.”320 
The Illinois Justice Project (“ILJP”), which helped craft the R3 provisions, notes 
that the legislation addresses root causes of violence as a mechanism of prevention, 
yet also that the R3 Program is just one step in the right direction.321 According to 
the ILJP,  
this law stands for . . . the idea that we’re going to invest in prevention 
and not just punishment, and that is something that is novel for our 
state. We will only be successful when every bill we pass speaks with the 
same voice as this one does. No one piece of legislation can address 
hundreds of years of systematic oppression and disinvestment, but this 
law had the intent that we’re going to start the process.322  
Evaluation of the R3 Program is years away yet other states should consider 
replication of R3 at the outset because, as noted above, allocating funds at the 
outset of an expected revenue increase is far more feasible politically than diverting 
funds that are already flowing into a state. 
Massachusetts adopted a more modest—or at least less detailed—approach to 
using adult-use marijuana revenue to address the needs of the communities 
impacted by aggressive and disparate enforcement of drug laws. The 
Massachusetts Marijuana Revenue Fund consists of licensing and registration fees 
 
 317. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/10-40(C)(1) (2019); Id. 705/10-40(c)(2) (2019) (stating that the ICJIA must 
reassess these designations every four years). 
 318. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/10-40(e) (2019). 
 319. Id. 705/10-40(e)(2). 
 320. Id. 705/10-40(g)(2). 
 321. Anna Lee & Sharone Mitchell, How Illinois Cannabis Law Aim to Reduce Violence and Restore 
Communities, CHI. COMMUNITY TR. (July 30, 2019), https://www.cct.org/2019/07/how-illinois-cannabis-laws-aim-
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from industry, civil penalties issued to those who violate laws regulating the 
industry, and adult-use marijuana taxes.323 Funds will be used to administer the 
adult-use program, with the remainder going to public-health oriented programs. 
Specifically, the funds will be used for:  
(i) public and behavioral health including but not limited to, evidence-
based and evidence-informed substance use prevention and treatment 
and substance use early intervention services in a recurring grant for 
school districts or community coalitions who operate on the strategic 
prevention framework or similar structure for youth substance use 
education and prevention; (ii) public safety; (iii) municipal police 
training; (iv) the Prevention and Wellness Trust Fund324 . . . ; and (v) 
programming for restorative justice, jail diversion, workforce 
development, industry specific technical assistance, and mentoring 
services for economically-disadvantaged persons in communities 
disproportionately impacted by high rates of arrest and incarceration for 
marijuana offenses . . . .325 
Where Illinois’ law is steeped in detail, Massachusetts’ law is devoid of detail on 
implementation. Without legislative direction, the MCCC created the Citizens 
Review Committee, a nine-member body comprised of community members, to 
assist the Commission with the social equity elements of the adult-use law and 
“make[] specific recommendations as to the use of community reinvestment funds 
in the areas of programming, restorative justice, jail diversion, workforce 
development, industry-specific technical assistance, and mentoring services, in 
areas of disproportionate impact.”326 Unlike in Illinois, the Committee’s role is 
advisory only; the Committee does not have the power to allocate any funds. 
Perhaps because of the lack of specificity regarding the use of marijuana revenues, 
the Massachusetts legislature is considering bills that would allocate marijuana tax 
revenues for specific purposes, such as after-school programs and youth substance 
abuse prevention.327 At this time, it is unclear how Massachusetts will use its 
 
 323. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94G, § 14(a) (2020). 
 324. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111 § 2G(c) (2020) (stating that the Prevention and Wellness Trust Fund is used to 
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community reinvestment funds or whether these funds will be siphoned off through 
piecemeal legislation. 
States considering adoption of adult-use laws with taxation of marijuana and 
licensure revenue should consider allocating funds to address the decades-long 
impact of aggressive, disparate enforcement of drug laws in communities of color. 
While we know little about how the Illinois provisions will ultimately impact the 
targeted communities, a law allocating the funds for particular purposes to be 
controlled by a public-private body through a grant process may be more effective 
than simply creating a fund with little specificity on its use and control solely in the 
government. Massachusetts legislators are already seeking to use marijuana 
revenue for various purposes328 and that trend will likely continue since the 
Commonwealth’s adult-use law and related regulations provide no assurance as to 
how the revenues will be used. Failure to separate marijuana revenues and create 
a system to process those funds for public health purposes may result in the use of 
revenues for purposes unrelated to the harms caused by drug policy in our 
communities of color. Much like funds from tobacco companies that started to flow 
into states as a result of the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement, marijuana 
revenues could be used to balance budgets in times of fiscal crisis329 or to increase 
general funds that can be used for any purpose.330 Creating a fund, establishing a 
process for use of the funds, and designating a public-private body to allocate the 
funds may be the better approach for states truly interested in reducing the 
profound negative impact of drug policy on communities of color. Creating such a 
fund concurrent with legalizing adult use and imposing a marijuana tax is likely the 
best approach to making sure those revenues are used effectively. 
CONCLUSION 
The war on drugs has taken an unjust toll on communities of color in this country 
with its shockingly disparate incarceration rates and the ancillary effects of this 
practice. As states liberalize their marijuana laws, through medical and recreational 
programs, efforts are being made to address the injustice of former policies.  These 
efforts are both prospective, the policy efforts to create a more inclusive legal 
marijuana industry, and retrospective, efforts to reinvest in communities 
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disproportionately impacted by the war on drugs.  As recently implemented state 
laws, there is insufficient data regarding which policies are the most effective in 
achieving the goals of inclusivity and reinvestment and this needs to be studied.  
However, even without this data, states that are on the cusp of implementing a 
legal marijuana industry should embrace inclusivity and reinvestment measures 
from the outset.  Once a regulatory system is established, generating the political 
momentum to implement these measures can be a challenge. Business interests 
with political influence and community presence may resist the increased 
administrative responsibilities and costs associated with these policy interventions.  
Resistance and incomplete data should not be allowed to perpetuate the 
disproportionate concentration of economic benefit from the legal marijuana 
industry or the lingering effects of the unjust war on drugs.  Every state that has or 
will liberalize their marijuana laws needs to escape from the shadow of 
discriminatory drug policies and work towards social justice and inclusion. 
 
